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CONDOMINIUMS, REFORM, AND THE UNIT
OWNERSHIP ACT
Robert G. Natelson"
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is the first published assessment of the Montana
Unit Ownership Act (UOA), the condominium statute adopted
over thirty years ago that serves as the legal basis for hundreds
of land developments throughout Montana. This assessment
relies on the text of the UOA, new empirical investigation, and
prior national condominium research by many scholars, includ-
ing myself.1
* Professor of Law, University of Montana; J.D., Cornell University; A.B.,
Lafayette College. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of
Professor Andrew P. Morriss, Case Western Reserve University Law School; Professor
Richard Stroup, Department of Economics, Montana State University; Professor Fred
S. McChesney, Emory University School of Law; Professor Roger Meiners, De-
partment of Economics, University of Texas at Arlington; Carol Hardy, Esq. of Bill-
ings, Montana, a practitioner of condominium law; Robert Verdon, Staff Legal Coun-
sel for the Professional and Occupational Licensing Bureau, Department of Com-
merce, State of Montana; and Jerry Kenney and Howard Sumner, both real estate
brokers in Billings, Montana.
1. Note on sources: sources cited more than once in this article, together with
the short citation form used, are set forth below. The full citation is given in any
footnote containing a source referenced only once.
See ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS (1989)
[hereinafter NATELSON, POA]; ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO
REAL PROPERTY (1992) [hereinafter NATELSON, DEEDS]; Paul H. Rubin, Growing a
Post-Communist Legal System, in Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, eds., THE PRI-
VATIZATION PROCESS: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 57 (1996) [hereinafter Rubin];
Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, Aug. 1990
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 745 [hereinafter Barzel & Sass]; Andrew P. Morriss, "This State
Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws"--Lessons from One Hundred Years of Codification in
Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 359 (1995) [hereinafter Morriss]; Robert G. Natelson,
Comments on the Historiography of Condominium: The Myth of Roman Origin, 12
OIxu. CITY L. REV. 17 (1987) [hereinafter Natelson, Comments]; Robert G. Natelson,
Consent, Coercion, and Reasonableness in Private Law: The Special Case of the Prop-
erty Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 41 (1990) [hereinafter, Natelson, Consent];
Robert G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 17 (1990)
[hereinafter, Natelson, Running]; Shmuel Nitzan & Jacob Paroush, Are Qualified
Majority Rules Special?, 42 PUBLIC CHOICE 257 (1984) [hereinafter Nitzan &
Paroush]; Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance
Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1261 (1991) [hereinafter Schill]; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz
& Scott]; James Charles Smith, Markets and Law Reform: The Tension Between Uni-
formity and Idealism, 20 NOVA. L. REV. 1165 (1996) [hereinafter Smith]; Robert D.
Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988) [hereinafter
Tollison]; James L. Winokur, Meaner Lienor Community Associations: The "Super
Priority" Lien and Related Reforms Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
This article is divided into six Parts. Part II sketches the
nature and history of condominium ownership. Part III provides
the history, organization, language and essential purpose of the
UOA. Part IV offers a philosophy for reform and concludes that
the Montana legislature ought to amend the UOA rather than
replace it. Part V makes detailed recommendations for such
reform. Finally, Part VI summarizes these conclusions.
II. THE CONDOMINIUM CONCEPT
A. Nature of Condominium Ownership2
A condominium is a real estate subdivision meeting all of
the following four criteria: (1) separate ownership3 of individual
portions of the real estate; (2) undivided co-ownership of common
property outside the separately owned portions, with each
owner's fractional interest in the common property being appur-
tenant to ownership of his separately owned portion; (3) restric-
tions on partition that (a) require that ownership of common
property remain appurtenant to ownership of separately owned
portions and (b) forbid partition of the common property; and (4)
a complicated scheme of servitudes to govern the subdivision. Al-
though laypersons often refer to separately owned portions as
condominiums, strictly speaking it is the entire property that is
the condominium.4
Following is a more detailed examination of each of the four
criteria of condominium ownership.
1. Separate Ownership of Individual Portions of the Real Estate
The prevailing American custom is to denominate the sepa-
rately owned portions as "units," a practice I follow in this Arti-
cle.5 Units may be owned by individuals or by co-tenants. The
Act, 27 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 353 (1992) [hereinafter Winokur, Meaner]; James L.
Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic
Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter
Winokur, Mixed].
2. Unless otherwise noted, the introductory material in this subpart is from
NATEISON, POA, supra note 1, at 11-16.
3. In a leasehold condominium, the owners hold separate interests in a ground
lease. See infra Part V(D).
4. The modern Latin word condominium means "co-ownership." The entire
development, not individual portions, is held in co-ownership.
5. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(15) (1995):
"Unit" means a part of the property including one or more rooms occupying
one or more floors or a part or parts thereof intended for any type of inde-
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owners of a unit enjoy exclusive use and possession of that unit.6
The recording of an instrument called a "condominium declara-
tion" creates the units by subdividing the legal estate (fee simple
or leasehold) by which the land is held into units and appurte-
nant common properties.
7
Most condominium units represent examples of "horizontal
property"-parcels with boundaries defined by horizontal, as well
as vertical planes.8 "First generation" condominium statutes9
were based on the assumption that all condominium units are
defined by horizontal as well as vertical boundaries. Some state
statutes still are based on this assumption.'0 However, most
newer condominium laws permit separate ownership of lots even
if the lots are defined by only vertical planes."
pendent use and with a direct exit to a public street or highway or to a
common area or area leading to a public street or highway.
Arguably, a better usage is to employ the term "unit" for each owner's entire
property interest-including both the separately owned portion and its appurtenant
share of the common properties. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 6.
6. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §70-23-402 (1995): "Exclusive ownership and
possession of unit-joint ownership.
(1) Each unit owner shall be entitled to the exclusive ownership and possession of
his unit.
(2) A unit may be jointly or commonly owned by more than one person."
7. Big Sky Hidden Village Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Hidden Village, Inc., 276
Mont. 268, 915 P.2d 845 (1996); Jordan v. Elizabethan Manor, 181 Mont. 424, 593
P.2d 1049 (1979).
8. Horizontal property is not unique to condominium ownership. It is also a
feature of mineral rights in "ownership in place" states, although the term "horizon-
tal property" does not appear in mineral law. See RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW
OF OIL AND GAs 29-31 (3d ed. 1991).
9. A "first generation" statute is one of that class of early condominium stat-
utes that largely tracked Puerto Rican law and a Federal Housing Administration
Model Statute based on Puerto Rican law. The UOA is a first generation statute. See
infra text accompanying notes 33-44.
10. One of these is apparently Montana. See infra Part III(B). Several states
denote their condominium statutes as "Horizontal Property Acts." See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-13-101 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995) ("Horizontal Property Act"); IND.
CODE ANN. § 32-1-6-1 (Michie 1995) ("Horizontal Property Law").
11. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIuM ACT § 1-103(7), 7 pt.11.2 U.LA 215 (1997),
which defines condominium so as not to require horizontal property: "Condominium'
means real estate, portions of which are designated for separate ownership and the
remainder of which is designated for common ownership solely by the owners of
those portions."The Uniform Condominium Act (UCA) has been adopted in Alabama, Arizona,
Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, Texas, Virginia and Washington. See 7 U.L.A. 335 (Supp. 1996).
The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA), which sets forth a
similar definition (§1-103(8)), has been enacted in one form or another in six states.
See 7 U.L.A. 204, 316 (Supp. 1996).
In addition to these 18 states, the leading condominium jurisdiction, Florida,
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2. Undivided Co-ownership of Certain Areas Outside the Units
In order for a real estate development to be a condominium,
areas outside the units must be titled to unit owners, who hold
in a form of co-tenancy similar to tenancy in common. In most
states, these co-owned areas are called "common elements." 2
Common elements comprehend both general common elements,
which are used by all owners, and limited common elements
where use (but not ownership) is limited to owners of fewer than
all units. Examples of limited common elements include a balco-
ny attached to a unit outside the unit perimeter; a parking space
on the common elements, but reserved for a specific owner(s);
and a roof covering a single building in a multi-building condo-
minium. 3 Without some common elements, there is no condo-
minium. 4 I reiterate that in a condominium the common ele-
also has dispensed with the horizontal property requirement. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
718.103(9),(24) (West Supp. 1996).
12. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(3) (1995): -'Common elements'
means the general common elements and the limited common elements." See also
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(8) (1995):
"General common elements," unless otherwise provided in a declaration or
by consent of all the unit owners, means:
(a) the land on which the building is located, except any portion thereof in-
cluded in a unit or made a limited common element by the declaration;
(b) the foundations, columns, girders, beams, supports, mainwalls [sic], roofs,
halls, corridors, lobbies, stairs, fire escapes, entrances, and exits of the
building,
(c) the basements, yards, gardens, parking areas, and outside storage spac-
es, private pathways, sidewalks, and private roads;
(d) installations of central services such as power, light, gas, hot and cold
water, heating, refrigeration, air conditioning, waste disposal, and incinerat-
(e) the elevators, tanks, pumps, motors, fans, compressors, ducts, and in
general all apparatus and installations existing for common use;
(f) the premises for the lodging of janitors or caretakers of the property;
and
(g) all other elements of the building necessary or convenient to its exis-
tence, maintenance, and safety or normally in common use.
More modem statutes define common elements simply as the portions of the
condominium outside the units. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-103(4), 7 pt. 2
U.L.A. 215 (1997).
The term "common elements" is imported from civil law, being borrowed from
the 1958 Puerto Rican statute. Ley Para establecer el Rgimen de Is Propiedad Hori-
zontal [Law to establish the Horizontal Property Regime], art. 8, 1958 P.R. Laws 104
(elementos comunes [common elements]).
13. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(9) (1995): "Limited common
elements' means those common elements designated in the declaration or by
agreement of all the unit owners as reserved for the use of a certain unit or number
of units to the exclusion of the other units."
14. In Country Club Towers, the pioneering horizontal property apartment
1997] CONDOMINIUMS 499
ments are titled to the unit owners-not to the association. Al-
though an association sometimes owns real estate in its own
right, any such real estate is not part of the common elements.
3. Restrictions on Partition
In a condominium regime, each unit's appurtenant share of
the common elements remains with that unit; no partition to the
contrary is permitted. When the unit is sold, inherited, levied
upon, or hypothecated, the appurtenant share of the common
elements adheres to the unit.' The common elements may not
be physically partitioned; they remain in co-tenancy of all unit
owners. 6 In this respect, condominium tenancy differs from
tenancy in common or joint 'tenancy: in those forms of concurrent
ownership, partition is generally permitted. 7
4. A Complicated Scheme of Servitudes to Govern the
Subdivision
The final criterion of condominium ownership is a servitude
regime to govern the subdivision. In most states, the condomini-
um declaration establishes these servitudes, although the UOA
contemplates their placement in the bylaws. 8 The servitudes
usually include affirmative easements of access for maintenance
and other purposes;' affirmative covenants imposing various
obligations, such as the duty to maintain one's unit or to pay as-
sessments; and restrictive covenants that limit property use.
Less frequently, the servitudes include negative easements and
building in Great Falls, Montana, the common areas are titled to the association. See
Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 90, 405 P.2d 432, 433 (1965). It
is therefore not a condominium.
15. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-404 (1995):
Common elements-undivided interest to remain attached to unit. The undi-
vided interest in the common elements shall not be separated from the unit
to which it appertains and shall be conveyed or encumbered with the unit
even though such interest is not expressly mentioned or described in the
conveyance or other instrument.
16. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-405 (1995): "Common elements to re-
main undivided-partition prohibited. The common elements shall remain undivided,
and no unit owner shall bring any action for partition or division of any part thereof
except as provided in 70-23-805. Any covenant to the contrary is void."
17. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 223 (2d ed. 1993). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-32-301 (1995)
(limiting right of spouse to divide homesteaded property without consent of other
spouse).
18. See infra text accompanying note 55.
19. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-504(2) (1995).
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reserved rents. Usually-in some states, always 2 -- the
servitudes establish a condominium association to administer the
complex.2 Many condominium declarations also create future
interests that may wholly or partially defease property interests
or change the nature of ownership. Examples include preemptive
rights and provisions dealing with property destruction, obsoles-
cence or eminent domain."
B. Historical Background"
Although antecedents of the condominium concept existed in
Medieval times,' the first true condominium statute was adopt-
ed in Belgium in 1924. The notion soon spread to other Civil
Law countries. In 1958, Puerto Rico became the first United
States jurisdiction to enact a condominium statute, relying
heavily on a 1952 Cuban law.
In 1961, Congress responded to a Puerto Rican lobbying
effort by amending the Federal Housing Act to permit the Feder-
al Housing Administration (FHA) to insure condominium mort-
gages. The FHA subsequently issued a Model Statute for the
Creation of Apartment Ownership (FHA Model Statute),'
which served as a highly influential model for "first generation"
state statutes. Many first generation laws are essentially verba-
tim copies of the FHA Model Statute.
Unlike the civil law, the Anglo-American common law was
fully adequate to create condominium ownership. Technically,
20. See, e.g., in Montana. See infra .text accompanying note 54.
21. For sample materials with general treatment of the role of servitudes in
condominiums and other covenanted subdivisions, see, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Cities
and Homeowner Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982); Richard A. Epstein,
Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988); NATELSON, POA, supra
note 1, at 37-64; Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1177 (1982). For thoughtful competing analyses of how servitudes work in
this context, see Gerald Korngold, Reply: Resolving the Flaws of Residential
Servitudes and Owners Associations: For Reformation Not Termination, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 513; Winokur, Mixed, supra note 1; James L. Winokur, Rejoinder: Reforming
Servitude Regimes: Toward Associational Federalism and Community, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 537.
22. See infra Part V(H) for a discussion of the Montana law of condominium
destruction, eminent domain, and obsolescence.
23. Except where otherwise indicated, information in this subpart is taken from
NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 19-35.
24. A common tale throughout legal writings is that condominiums existed in
ancient Rome. This tale is false. See Natelson, Comments, supra note 1.
25. It may be found in PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, 1A CONDOMIN-
rum LAW AND PRACTICE Appendix B-3 (1994).
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there was no need for authorizing statutes. Indeed, United
States developers had created condominiums and entities similar
to condominiums well before adoption of the first state condo-
minium statute.5 First generation statutes, however, served to
reassure private drafters by offering "safe harbors-statutory
procedures that, if followed, guaranteed legal enforcement of the
drafters' product. Such safe harbors are particularly important to
developers seeking mortgage financing and title insurance. 7 Ac-
cordingly, all fifty states have enacted condominium statutes.
Nevertheless, in most states common law rules and private
drafting supplement condominium statutes and offer alternative
paths for planners wishing to create subdivisions similar to con-
dominiums.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE MONTANA UNIT OWNERSHIP ACT
A. The UOA as a Safe Harbor Statute
Statutes usually are thought of as prescriptive in nature:
laying down immutable rules to regulate or shape personal be-
havior. But statutes may serve alternative functions as well:
checklists to aid private drafting, sources of default rules to
resolve questions when the parties have not agreed to the con-
trary, optional "safe harbors" from legal uncertainty, and aids to
good private decision-making. Statutes that aid private decision-
making include those that ensure the parties have actual notice
of all relevant material facts (e.g., disclosure statutes), those that
protect exercise of volition (e.g., anti-duress statutes), and those
that give legal force to private agreements."
The UOA29 serves all these functions in one way or anoth-
er,30 but its essence is as a "safe harbor" statute. A declarant
26. NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 55-60.
27. Telephone Interview with Carol Hardy, Esq., Billings, Mont. (Aug. 9, 1996).
28. This list is not necessarily exhaustive. For example, some statutes serve
merely as statements of community values. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-
501 (West 1990) (stating that adultery is illegal, but no penalty is provided by the
statute).
29. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-101 to -1002 (1995).
30. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(8) (1995) (checklist and default rule
functions); § 70-23-102(10) (1995) (default rule); §§ 70-23-201 to -206 (1995) (regula-
tion and shaping); §§ 70-23-301, 70-23-305, 70-23-307 (1995) (regulation); § 70-23-308
(regulation and checklist); § 70-23-403(2) (1995) (aid to private decision making
through enforcement of prior agreement); § 70-23-607(1) (regulation of mortgage prior-
ity); § 70-23-613 (1995) (aid to private decision making through disclosure); § 70-23-
102(4)(b) (1995) (aid to private decision making by enforcing unit owners' agreement
regarding common expenses); and §§ 70-23-401, 70-23-404, 70-23-601 (1995) (safe
1997]
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voluntarily elects to submit property to the UOA; nothing re-
quires such a submission." The common law of Montana autho-
rizes nonstatutory alternatives, and developers frequently opt to
proceed outside the statute when creating subdivisions with
compact units.32 But if one does choose to follow the rules of the
statute, one has greater security knowing that one's actions will
be enforced.
B. Traces of the Puerto Rican Past
The Montana legislature adopted the UOA in 1965. The text
largely traces the FHA Model Statute, which reflects in turn the
1958 Puerto Rican enactment. The legislature has amended the
UOA infrequently. The most notable amendments are the con-
sumer protection provisions added in 1973 and 1983. 33
If one with substantial condominium experience examines
the original parts of the UOA, he gets the impression that the
text and substance are out of place in the modern environment.
For example, the section that describes the legal independence of
units from each other refers to "juridic acts inter vivos or mortis
causa.... "' -terms hardly common in American law. 3' The
harbor for conveyances).
31. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(5) (1995): "'Condominium' means the
ownership of single units with common elements located on property submitted to
the provisions of this chapter."
32. Such alternatives are based primarily on the common law of servitudes. See
NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 55-60. Thus, the Montana Supreme Court validated
and created rules of common law governing a prestatutory horizontal property regime
in the Country Club Tower litigation: Montana ex rel. Burris v. Tower Management
Corp., 145 Mont. 448, 401 P.2d 575 (1965); Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp.,
146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965); Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 147 Mont.
1, 409 P.2d 813 (1966). For a non-horizontal property case, see Town & Country
Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987).
One of the most common non-statutory alternatives in Montana is the "town
house community," used when row houses are held by a form of interdependent prop-
erty ownership slightly different from condominium. See, e.g., Declaration of Cove-
nants, Conditions and Restrictions for Homestead Townhouses, microformed on Doc.
No. 164355, Book 94 of Misc., p. 3979, Nov. 21, 1986 (Gallatin County, Montana,
Clerk and Recorder's Office). Often the covenants and rules for such communities are
very similar to those prevailing in condominiums. See, e.g., Declaration of Covenants
and Restrictions for Bridger Creek Subdivision, microformed on Doc. No. 301845,
Book 151, p. 2890, Feb. 28, 1995 (Gallatin County, Montana, Clerk and Recorder's
Office).
33. The 1973 additions are MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-201 to -206, 70-23-1001
and 70-23-1002. The 1983 addition was § 70-23-613. These provisions are discussed
infra Part V(I).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-401 (1995):
Property status of the unit. While the property is submitted to this chapter,
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reason for the oddity is that this section is almost a direct trans-
literation from the Puerto Rican text, which served a civil law,
rather than a common law environment."
Another peculiarity is the provision that defines "manager"
as the "manager, board of managers, or other person in charge of
the administration of or managing the property."37 This usage is
confusing because American condominiums are nearly always
governed by a board of directors, which is never referred to as
the "manager"; the board usually hires another entity as the
"manager." Indeed, elsewhere the statute explicitly refers to this
practice.3" Unfortunately, the odd definition of "manager" raises
the question of whether obligations the UOA imposes on the
"manager"39 are imposed on the hired manager or, as the latter
section would suggest, on the board. It becomes clear that those
duties are imposed on the board only after one discovers that the
definition of "manager" is another relic of the Puerto Rican stat-
ute, which reflects a civil law tradition of entrusting condomini-
um governance to a single person.'
Still another historical curiosity is the section that requires
that each unit's interest in the common elements be founded on
the "relation that the value of the unit at the date of the declara-
tion bears to the then combined value of all the units having an
interest in the particular common elements."41 Outside Montana
the applicable percentages and accompanying voting rules often
are based on any of several measures, each selected to serve the
needs of different kinds of condominiums.42 Puerto Rican prece-
dent dictated the Montana statutory language.4 Yet, the Mon-
a unit in the building may be individually conveyed, leased, or encumbered
and may be the subject of ownership, possession, or sale and of all types of
juridic acts inter vivos or mortis causa as if it were sole and entirely inde-
pendent of the other units in the building of which they form a part, and
the corresponding individual titles and interests shall be recordable.
35. The term mortis causa, which refers to wills and intestate succession,
should not be confused with the common law gift causa mortis.
36. Ley Para establecer el Rgimen de la Propiedad Horizontal [Law to estab-
lish the Horizontal Property Regime], art. 4, 1958 P.R. Laws 104 ("y de toda clase de
actos juridicos intervivos o mortis causa .. . ." ["and every class of juridic act
intervivos or mortis causa ... "). A "juridic act intervivos or mortis causa" means a
transfer by inheritance or will rather than among living people.
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(11) (1995).
38. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-308(1) (1995).
39. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-606 (1995) (record keeping).
40. Referred to as the syndicat. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 2, at 31.
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-403(1) (1995).
42. See Barzel & Sass, supra note 1.
43. See Ley Para establecer el Regimen de la Propiedad Horizontal [Law to
1997] 503
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tana statute adds a sentence not appearing in the Puerto Rican
prototype: "Value need not conform to market value."' The re-
sult leaves one wondering just what the statute is supposed to
mean.
Uncritical borrowing from civil law sources creates an anom-
alous role for condominium bylaws. In usual American practice,
"bylaws" are rules for the internal governance of an association
or corporation-more akin to statutes than to constitutive docu-
ments and more easily changed. The UOA, however, prescribes a
constitutive role for the bylaws. The implications of this are
discussed in Part V.'
C. Organization of the UOA
The UOA contains nine Parts. Part 2, "Regulation of Unit
Sales Prior to Construction," and Part 10, "Enforcement and
Penalty," are consumer protection regulations added by the legis-
lature in 1973 and are discussed in Part (V)(I) of this article."
Part 1, "General Provisions," and Part 3, "Cre-
ation-Declaration and Bylaws," contain most of the rules for
establishing a condominium. The UOA provides that a condomin-
ium is established by the execution, acknowledgement, and re-
cording of a condominium declaration.47 Only land described in
establish the Horizontal Property Regime], art. 8, 1958 P.R. Laws 104 ("El titular
tendr derecho exclusivo a su apartamiento y a una participaci6n con las dem~is
titulares en los elementos comunes de inmueble, equivalente al porcentaje que
represente el valor de su apartamiento dentro del conjunto del inmueble." ["The own-
er will have the exclusive right to his apartment and a share with the other owners
in the common elements of the realty, equivalent to the percentage that represents
the value of his apartment within the whole of the real estate."]).
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-403(1) (1995).
45. These problems are not unique; much confusion in the law of American
property owners associations can be traced to inadequate legal work undertaken by
federal authorities. See, e.g., NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 618-19 (problems in
FHA Form 1401 for certain non-condominium subdivisions).
46. See infra Part V(I).
47. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(6) (1995): "'Declaration' means the instru-
ment by which the property is submitted to the provisions of this chapter." See also
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-103 (1995):
Applicability - submission by declaration required. In order to submit any
property to the provisions of this chapter, the sole owner or sole lessee or
all of the owners or all of the lessees thereof shall execute, acknowledge,
and record a declaration in the office of the recording officer of the county
in which the property is located. The declaration shall be executed in accor-
dance with 70-23-301.
See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-305(1) (1995): "When a declaration is made and
approved as required, it must, upon the payment of the fees provided by law, be
recorded by the recording officer. The fact of recording and the date of recording
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the declaration as covered thereby becomes part of the condomin-
ium." Property previously held in condominium, but since re-
leased, may be resubmitted.49
The UOA further requires that the declaration include a
land description, the name of the condominium, descriptions of
units and of general common elements and of limited common
elements, the use for which the condominium is designed, the
name of an agent for service of process, and "any other details
regarding the property that the person executing the declaration
considers desirable."" The statute also permits, but does not
require, recording of a preliminary declaration." Floor plans are
filed "with" the declaration, but unlike some other statutes, the
UOA does not specify that the plans are part of the
declaration.52
The bylaws serve a similar constitutive purpose, and are
recorded with the declaration.53 Their prescribed content in-
must be entered on the declaration."
48. See Big Sky Hidden Village Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Hidden Village, Inc., 276
Mont. 268, 915 P.2d 845 (1996).
49. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-806 (1995).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-301 (1995):
Contents of declaration. A declaration shall contain:
(1) a description of the land, whether leased or in fee simple, on which the
building is or is to be located;
(2) the name by which the property shall be known
and a general description of the building, including the number of stories
and basements, the number of units, and the principal materials of which it
is constructed;
(3) the unit designation, location, approximate area of each unit, and any
other data necessary for proper identification;
(4) a description of the general common elements and the percentage of the
interest of each unit owner therein;
(5) a description of the limited common elements, if any, stating to which
units their use is reserved and in what percentage;
(6) a statement of the use for which the building and each of the units is
intended;
(7) the name of a person to receive service of
process in the cases provided in 70-23-901 and the residence or place of
business of such person which shall be within the county in which the
property is located;
(8) any other details regarding the property that the person executing the
declaration considers desirable.
51. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-302 (1995).
52. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-306 (1995). But cf UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT
§ 2-109(a), 7 U.LA. 256 (1997) (plans are part of declaration).
53. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-307 (1995):
Bylaws--adoption, recording, and amendment.
(1) The unit owners of each property shall adopt bylaws to govern the ad-
ministration of the property.
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cludes the requirement of an owner's association, no matter how
small the condominium.' The bylaws include not only corporate
governance procedures expected in American bylaws, but also
language that defines property rights, including running cove-
nants for assessments and restricting land use.55 The statute
(2) A copy of the bylaws, certified by the presiding officer and secretary of
the association, shall be recorded simultaneously with the declaration of the
property to which the bylaws relate.
(3) An amendment of the bylaws shall not be effective unless approved by
75% of the unit owners and until a copy of the bylaws, as amended, certi-
fied by the presiding officer and secretary of the association of unit owners,
is recorded.
Before filing of the declaration, the "unit owners" who adopt the bylaws are
the developer or other person who owns the land. See Jordan v. Elizabethan Manor,
181 Mont. 424, 593 P.2d 1049 (1979), discussed infra Part V(D).
54. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(1) (1995) ("Association of unit owners"
defined as "all the unit owners acting as a group in accordance with the declaration
and bylaws"); see also Edgewater Townhouse Homeowner's Ass'n v. Holtman, 256
Mont. 182, 845 P.2d 1224 (1993) (POA membership appurtenant to ownership of
units).
55. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-308 (1995).
Contents of bylaws. The bylaws shall provide for:
(1) the election from among the unit owners of a board of directors, the
number of persons constituting the board, and that the terms of at least
one-third of the directors shall expire annually; the powers and duties of
the board; the compensation, if any, of the directors; the method of removal
from office of the directors; and whether or not the beard may engage the
services of a manager or managing agent;
(2) the method of calling meetings of the unit
owners and the percentage, if other than a majority as defined by 70-23-
102(10), that shall constitute a quorum;
(3) the election of a chairman, a secretary, and a treasurer,
(4) the maintenance, upkeep, and repair of the common elements and pay-
ment for the expense thereof, including the method of approving payment
vouchers;
(5) the employment of personnel necessary for the
maintenance, upkeep, and repair of the common elements;
(6) the manner of collecting from the unit owners their share of the com-
mon expenses;
(7) the method of adopting and of amending administrative rules governing
the details of the operation and use of the common elements;
(8) such restrictions on and requirements respecting the use and mainte-
nance of the units and the use of the common elements, not included in the
declaration, as are designed to prevent unreasonable interference with the
use of their respective units and of the common elementi by the several
unit owners;
(9) the method of amending the bylaws subject to
70-23-307.
For the role of "restrictions on and requirements respecting the use and main-
tenance of the units" as running covenants and other kinds of servitudes, compare
Association of Unit Owners of Deer Lodge Condominium, Inc. v. Big Sky of Montana,
Inc., 242 Mont. 358, 790 P.2d 967 (1990); Association of Unit Owners of Deer Lodge
Condominium v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., 245 Mont. 64, 798 P.2d 1018 (1990);
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provides that the Property Owners Association (POA) may adopt
administrative rules in addition to the bylaws, and that both are
binding on all unit owners. 6 At times, use restrictions expected
only in recorded covenants appear in the administrative rules.57
Part 4 of the UOA, "Nature of the Ownership Interest,"
contains language (usual in condominium statutes) defining
units as separately owned parcels of property with appurtenant
common elements, with partition duly restricted.58
Part 5, "Rights and Duties Incidental to Unit Ownership,"
sets forth sketchy provisions related to condominium mainte-
nance; requires owners to comply with the declaration, bylaws,
and administrative rules; and invalidates unit owners' waivers of
the costs and benefits of common elements.59 One section'
strongly implies what case law subsequently settled: that land
use rules in condominium documentation are common law
servitudes: mostly affirmative easements and covenants running
with the land.6'
Part 6, "Conveyances, Liens, and Common Expenses," is
devoted primarily to liens, including those securing collection of
maintenance assessments. 2 One section, however, governs the
form of unit conveyances,63 another authorizes insurance for the
Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965).
56. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-506 (1995):
Compliance with bylaws, rules, and covenants required-action. Each unit
owner shall comply with the bylaws and with the administrative rules
adopted pursuant thereto and with the covenants, conditions, and re-
strictions in the declaration or in the deed to his unit. Failure to comply
therewith shall be grounds for an action maintainable by the association of
unit owners or by an aggrieved unit owner.
For administrative regulations, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-613(2) (1995).
57. See, e.g., Rules and Regulations for The Narrows Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.,
microformed on Recep. No. 331110, June 14, 1991 (Lake County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office) (pertaining to pets and architectural restrictions, inter alia).
58. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-401 to -405 (1995).
59. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-501 to -506 (1995).
60. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-506 (1995).
61. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 58-60.
62. These sections are discussed infra Part V(E).
63. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-601 (1995):
Contents of deed or lease of unit. The deed or lease of a unit shall contain:
(1) a description of the land, the name of the property, and the recording
index numbers and date of recording of the declaration;
(2) the unit designation of the unit;
(3) the use for which the unit is intended;
(4) the percentages of undivided interest in the common elements appertain-
ing to the unit;
(5) any further details the grantor and grantee or lessor and lessee may
consider desirable.
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condominium," and still another requires certain disclosures to
prospective unit purchasers.'
Part 7, mandating separate property taxation of individual
units, was moved to the state tax assessment law in 1985, and is
no longer part of the UOA. Part 8, "Removal of Property From
Unit Ownership Act," is devoted to termination of the condomini-
um regime, and is discussed in greater detail in Part V(H) of this
Article. Finally, UOA Part 9, "Actions and Process," deals with
lawsuits by and against unit owners, and is discussed in Part
V(G).
IV. APPROACHING REFORM
A. Assessing the Functions of Statutes
The extent to which one favors prescriptive statutes on a
subject tends to mirror the extent to which one favors political
regulation, rather than private regulation, of that subject. Pre-
scriptive statutes are products of the political process, and repre-
sent the judgment of politicians as to what ought or ought not be
done in particular circumstances. Because the usual course of
private law is to promote and enforce bargains and hypothetical
bargains, preference for common law often reflects a preference
for private ordering."1 Thus, analogies are drawn between codi-
fication and central planning on the one hand, and common law
and free markets on the other." Not surprisingly, as the role of
centralized decision-making has grown throughout this century,
so also has the role of statutes.
But the trend toward centralized decision-making recently
has reversed-partly due to the dramatic collapse of centralized
societies and partly due to a swelling tide of empirical research
that implicates statism for ensuing stagnation and credits free-
dom for ensuing progress. 9
64. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-612 (1995).
65. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-613 (1995). See infra Part V(I).
66. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-8-511 (1995).
67. For discussion of the role of common law, see NATELSON, DEEDS supra note
1, at 513-74. Of course, the statement in the text is subject to many qualifications.
For example, David Dudley Field himself, the quintessential codifier, was also a clas-
sical liberal on economic questions. However, the proposition in the text is perhaps
more true today than in Field's time.
Note also that statutes serve functions other than prescription. See infra text
accompanying notes 73-75.
68. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 1.
69. See Robert G. Natelson, Tax and Spending Limits for Montana?, 1994 INDE-
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Accompanying the disillusionment with central planning has
been a renewed skepticism toward prescriptive statutes and
codification, in part because of the "knowledge problem": the
Hayekian observation that knowledge is too decentralized, and
the world too complex and too ephemeral, for central planners to
know enough or react fast enough to act efficiently. Thus, Profes-
sor Paul H. Rubin, in an article rejecting codification as a source
of contract law in post-Communist nations, states:
For anyone or any group to be able to craft such a body of law
is as likely as for a decision maker to be able to design a com-
plex economy de novo. It is of course the impossibility of this
latter task that has caused the current situation in the relevant
economies."
In addition to the "knowledge problem," there is a realization
that even when good data are available, policy-makers often
ignore them because policy-makers face powerful incentives to do
SO.71
A more flexible alternative to the prescriptive statute is the
default rule statute. However, even this approach may expect too
much of the legislator. Inappropriate default rules can render
drafting errors expensive, and when faulty rules are enshrined
in statute, courts may feel powerless to mitigate them. Drafting,
in any case, is not without costs, and until a few bad outcomes
result, those preparing documents may not even think to draft
around the default rule.7 2
Therefore, in many cases the "safe harbor" statute is prefera-
ble to either the prescriptive or default rule approach. If the safe
harbor statute proves inapt, drafters can disregard it and courts
can validate or invalidate their efforts, according to common law.
The primary risks of the safe harbor statute are that the safe
PENDENCE INST. 10-94 (summarizing previous research connecting prior changes in
tax levels and other measures of government with subsequent inverse changes in eco-
nomic growth, and similar connections for Montana). THE ECONOMIST regularly sum-
marizes new studies along the same line. See, e.g., Of Liberty and Prosperity: Does
Economic Freedom Help a Country Grow More Quickly?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 13,
1996, at 21.
70. Rubin, supra note 1, at 61.
71. See Tollison, supra note 1 (introducing public choice studies of role of incen-
tives and structure on legislation).
72. An example of a default rule with disastrous potential is the "equitable
conversion" default rule prescribing that in an executory contract for the sale of real
estate the risk is on the vendee. Today, parties almost universally contract to the
contrary, but this takes paper, ink, and time. See also Smith, supra note 1, at 1184
(contracting out of default rule giving land vendor a right to specific performance).
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harbor itself may not be justified as sound public policy and that
the statute may inhibit innovation.
Other low-risk alternatives to the prescriptive statute are
legislative checklists73 and disclosure laws. The latter are de-
signed to facilitate efficient agreements by ensuring that all
parties have actual notice of relevant material facts. However,
an unartfully drafted disclosure law may mandate either
overdisclosure or underdisclosure. Overdisclosure imposes need-
less expense on both parties: one person must make and docu-
ment the disclosure while the other must wade through useless
information. Such a statute may inhibit, rather than encourage,
desirable agreement. On the other hand, underdisclosure leaves
at least one party with problems he did not bargain for. Without
actual notice of serious undisclosed problems, the agreed-upon
price cannot reflect the existence of those problems.7 '
Thus, in addressing the law of condominium, the legislature
must take care not to do too much. Lawmakers should proceed
incrementally. They should focus on providing legal security to
those choosing the condominium form without unduly restricting
freedom of contract or the market's (i.e., society's) ability to meet
new challenges.
B. Assessing Codification
1. The Urge to Codify
The foregoing discussion on the limits of statutes affords
some insight into resolving a natural question: If changes in
Montana's condominium law are necessary, why not repeal the
UOA altogether and enact a broader, better organized scheme-a
code drafted for Montana, or the Uniform Condominium Act, or
the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act? In other words,
why not codify?
Codification proponents argue that because codes set forth
rules in statutory form rather than leaving them to successive
litigation, codes increase the law's certainty, predictability and
accessibility. Proponents further contend that it is often easier to
adopt a new law rather than reform a current one.
Montana codification advocates have particularly favored
uniform codes, such as the Field Code and, more recently, pro-
73. Cf Morriss, supra note 1, at 445 (Laws must answer the questions people
ask, not questions from another time and place. . . ").
74. See NATELSON, DEEDS, supra note 1, at 522.
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posals by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Codification advocates note that enacting a uniform
law imports as persuasive authority existing court cases constru-
ing it. If a specific proposal has not been widely accepted else-
where, they argue that the change will place Montana at the
forefront of wise legal reform. If it has been widely accepted
elsewhere, they contend that the change will ensure that our
statutes are uniform with those of other states. Such arguments
have a long history of success in Montana. Enactment of the
Field Code has been followed by adoption of a great many uni-
form laws.75 The time has come, however, to reappraise this
devotion to codification, at least in the realm of private law; for
there is growing evidence that the results have not been an un-
qualified success.
2. Results of Past Codification Efforts
Montana's long-standing penchant for codification of such
private law areas as property, agency and contracts sharply
diverges from the pattern in most other American states,
76
where the shaping of private law usually has been left to the
courts, and legislative intervention has been of an ad hoc rather
than a comprehensive nature.77 This has been true particularly
in real estate with its inherently local nature and multitudinous
variations in practice, 78 although particular sections of the uni-
form acts sometimes have been influential in real estate law.79
75. The 1995 General Index to Montana Code Annotated at 2608-13 lists no
fewer than 51 uniform laws adopted here.
76. The few states that have comprehensively codified private law are the civil
law jurisdiction of Louisiana and the four states that adopted the complete Field
Civil Code: California, the Dakotas, and Montana. A nineteenth century "codification"
in Georgia was merely a collection and organization of that state's existing law. See
Morriss, supra note 1, at 372 n.52.
77. Even the most widely adopted uniform laws tend to be of the ad hoc vari-
ety, including all of the Uniform Commercial Code except Article 9.
78. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Wasted Days and Wasted Nights: Why the
Land Acts Failed, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1037 (1996). Not discussed in that article is the
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, promulgated nearly a quarter of a
century ago, but adopted only in Montana and 14 other states. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT, 7B U.L.A. 63 (Supp. 1996). Perhaps the most successful
comprehensive uniform real estate laws have been (if considered together) the UCA
and the UCIOA, but only 18 states have adopted either one or the other. See supra
note 11. See also Schill, supra note 1, at 1300-04 (variations of conditions among
states).
79. See Gerald Korngold, Seller's Damages from a Defaulting Buyer of Realty:
The Influence of the Uniform Land Transactions Act on the Courts, 20 NOVA L. REV.
1069 (1996); Norman Siebrasse & Catherine Walsh, The Influence of the ULSIA on
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Montana legal scholars have long contributed their talents
to state law reform, but until recently there was no scholarly
discussion on whether Montana was benefitting from codification
per se. The first break in a century of silence came inadvertent-
ly, with publication of my 1990 article on the Montana law of
running covenants. 0 That project's initial purpose was simply
to synthesize existing law, which is purportedly based on sec-
tions of the original Field Civil Code. However, the difficulty of
finding order in this law forced me to re-assess the wisdom of
the Code itself.
I concluded that instead of rendering the law more stable,
more predictable and more fair-as its advocates had assert-
ed-codification had done exactly the opposite. When confronted
with statutes that were difficult to understand8 and did not
comport with local culture, 2 the Montana Supreme Court had
often ignored or twisted them. The resulting mixture of ill-fitting
statutes and aversive cases had become so difficult to under-
stand, so contradictory, and so uneven of application that it
could hardly be called "law" at all. Accordingly, I concluded that
the code sections on running covenants had been a failure and
urged the legislature to repeal them and allow a distinctively
Montana common law to develop. As often occurs in the wake of
suggested reforms to mere "lawyers' law," the legislature did
nothing."
In 1995, Professor Andrew P. Morriss of Case Western Re-
serve University published the results of his own study on the
Montana Field Code provisions governing discharge from em-
ployment. He agreed that the courts had diverged from the Civil
Code, and that this was the result of a hostile legal culture and
the Proposed New Brunswick Land Security Act, 20 NOvA L. REv. 1133 (1996). De-
spite my counsel in this article against wholesale adoption of uniform acts, I also
recommend borrowing particular provisions where appropriate. See infra notes 277-84
and accompanying text.
80. See Natelson, Running, supra note 1.
81. Difficulties arose because of the language in the code and because its orig-
inal premise was that it would be Napoleonic in nature-completely displacing, rath-
er than coexisting with, common law. See Natelson, Running, supra note 1, at 37,
88-89.
82. See id. at 89-93.
83. This inattention may baffle those who cling to what public choice econo-
mists call the "romantic notion" of politics. See Tollison, supra note 1, at 362. The
public choice explanation is that policy makers have stronger incentives to expand
their power than to correct existing misapplications of it. The dominant incentives
are created by organized interests that have learned to manipulate existing rules.
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the Code's variance from local conditions."
Moreover, Professor Morriss identified other unfortunate
results from codification, including inducements for special inter-
est lobbying:
When the Codes established a rule that previously did not exist
(as opposed to simply rearranging existing Montana statutes),
some interests benefitted from the new rule. Those interests
now had a stake in defending the continued existence of the
new rule, an interest they would not have had otherwise. By
creating a rule, the legislature provided an incentive to orga-
nize the affected interests in the rule's defense, assisting in
overcoming the collective action problems inherent in lobby-
ing.85
Furthermore, he concluded that codification promoted needless
political intervention in society, and excessive restrictions on
personal freedom-generally to the benefit of those special inter-
ests with Helena lobbyists at the expense of the public at large:
Additionally, the lack of a comprehensive code would have
eliminated the political legitimacy granted to interventionist
legislation by the Codes' attempt to gather all of Montana soci-
ety within their framework. Of course, legislators in states
without codes have managed to serve special interests at the
expense of the public and to pass statist legislation. Neverthe-
less, increasing the barriers to such actions would have served
Montana well....
The existence of the comprehensive Civil Code promoted
the idea that the legislature's role legitimately included sub-
jects such as limiting the freedom of individuals to contract for
employment longer than two years or requiring licenses of the
owners of stallions whose owners sold their breeding services.
The codifiers created a system built around legislation rather
than law. This left Montana with an interventionist govern-
ment mindset that continues today.'
Professor Morriss' second two conclusions about the 1895
codification-that it encouraged special interest lobbying and
excessive political intervention-are equally applicable to any
codification, whether or not as extensive as the Field Code. This
is because overarching statutory schemes tend to encourage
84. See Morriss, supra note 1, at 417-42.
85. See id. at 443 (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 443-44, 447 (citing anomalous Montana examples of state socialism
and central regulatory control).
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organization of special interests and legislative intervention on
their behalf. One could argue, though, that the first conclu-
sion-the purely legal problems of uncertainty and lack of local
adaptation-might be avoided if the codification were of more
modest scope, as a codification of condominium law would be.The problems still would outweigh the benefits. If adapted
perfectly to Montana on the date of enactment, such a code
would soon become obsolete from increasingly rapid changes in
conditions and innovation.87 Moreover, it is highly unlikely that
such a code would be adapted perfectly to Montana. The state
legislative process is barely adequate for ad hoc intervention; it
is simply not up to the job of comprehensive codification.
To grasp the latter point, one need only examine the defects
in the procedure that induced the legislature to "bolt" the Field
Codes wholesale without serious reflection, opposition or amend-
ment, and utterly without consideration of their controversial
history in New York and California.' All of these defects still
plague the Montana legislative process, at least to some extent,
more than a century later. For example:
1. Labor shortage
Although Montana's statutes in 1895 were in defective con-
dition, just as the UOA is today, 9 and although most members
of the Montana Bar agreed the situation should be improved,"e
no one wanted to do the work of intelligently re-organizing exist-
ing statutes and court decisions.91 Even the codification commis-
sion empaneled to adapt the Field Codes to Montana seems to
have done little in that line.92 As modern Montana law reform-
ers know, the labor situation hasn't changed much. Regular
87. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 1174 (private market for real estate war-
ranties developed that might have been precluded by codification); see id. at 1176-78
(Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act fails to take into consideration devel-
opment of title insurance market).
88. Most of these defects were identified in Morriss, supra note 1. In Running,
I did not examine closely the decision making process that led to code enactment,
except to note that Montana's principal codification proponents were Easterners with-
out substantial code practice experience. See Natelson, Running, supra note 1, at 91.
89. See Morriss, supra note 1, at 362, 381 & 446.
90. See id. at 362-63.
91. See id. at 374, 443 & n.55. This was a problem in California as well, before
that state gave up efforts to re-organize its statutes and adopted the Field Code
instead. See id. at 376. And no wonder: statutory revision is grueling labor.
92. On failure to adapt the Codes, see Morriss, supra note 1, at 405. The an-
notations also were inadequate. See id. at 433.
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sessions of the legislature last only ninety days and meet only
once every two years. There is a legislative drafting support
staff, but its talents are uneven and it is often overworked, for
the press of business is far greater than in 1895. Law reformers
generally end up doing most of the work themselves.93
2. Undue Concentration of Decision-Making Power
Once a few key people had agreed that the Field Codes were
a "done deal," they were. As is true today, in 1895 Montana was
a small state with a relatively uncomplicated economy, so una-
nimity among influential players could be more readily achieved
than in larger polities." But nothing is so likely to lead to error
than premature consensus, which inevitably conceals undis-
cussed pitfalls. In the wake of the Field codification, Montanans
discovered pitfalls galore and are still finding them.
3. Inaccurate Promotion Campaign
To sell the Field Codes to the general public, proponents
resorted to tactics eerily familiar to modern observers of state
politics. One such tactic was to appeal to Montanans' pride by
telling them that adoption of the Codes would put their state in
the forefront of modern legal reform. 5 Another was simply to
misrepresent the content of the codes-repeatedly and shame-
lessly. For example, even respected proponents testified that the
Codes fit in well with the common law tradition and did little
more than re-organize existing Montana law." Sadly, Montana
93. Dean E. Edwin Eck reports that in a recent revision of Montana trust law,
largely from a pre-existing California statute, "eight to ten" members of the Montana
Bar participated in about six meetings over a three to four year period. Actual draft-
ing fell mostly on Dean Eck. Telephone Interview with E. Edwin Eck, Dean of the
University of Montana School of Law (July 30, 1996).
94. See Morriss, supra note 1, at 372-74 & n.55 (making a similar observation
about Dakota Territory). On this point, compare James Madison, THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961) (small polities more at
risk from "factions" [special interests] than large ones because smaller polities have
fewer factions; thus, factions have lower organization costs and can more readily
"concert and execute their plans of oppression.").
95. See Morriss, supra note 1, at 363.
96. See, e.g., id. at 363 (Code Commissioner Decius Wade claimed the imposi-
tion of Roman law in Britain was the key to the development of English common
law); id. at 388 (Helena Daily Herald reported that a panel of lawyers told a joint
meeting of the Montana Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Code Committee
that the Codes were "made up, with the exception of about one hundred sections, of
the present Montana laws. The only difference is that in the new code the laws, in-
stead of being scattered broadcast throughout the volume, have been put in their
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political decision-making still is afflicted with this sort of brazen
misrepresentation, both to the public and to the legislature. 7
4. Information Breakdown
During the legislative process, information about constituent
wants and needs should flow freely to lawmakers, who should
then compare those data and their own knowledge with infor-
mation about bills they must vote on. During the 1895 session,
however, lawmakers did not have the resources, time or exper-
tise necessary to examine the Field Codes, so the normal infor-
mation-flow process broke down.9"
Similar information blockages involving large bills remain
common in the legislative process. For example, a major informa-
tion blockage occurred during the 1993 general session with
respect to the most critical of all measures-the state budget.
For several reasons," many lawmakers were under the impres-
sion that the budget bill reduced state spending when in fact it
greatly increased spending. Admittedly, any condominium re-
codification scheme would not be as massive as the state budget
proper divisions under their proper heads."); id. at 389 (Bar Association committee
stated that "the changes are few and necessary").
97. As chairman since 1993 of Montanans for Better Government, a statewide
civic/watchdog group, it is part of my job to track Montana political misrepresenta-
tion. It is a substantial undertaking. Only a minority of these misrepresentations are
reported in the press. Some examples include Bob Anez, Truth Gets Back Seat in 2
Campaigns, BILLINGS GAZETTE, June 30, 1996, at 3C (public misrepresentations by
two statewide candidates for office); Mike Dennison, Rhetorical Battle: How Racicot
Sees the Issues, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, Dec. 3, 1995, at 4A (extensive misrepresenta-
tions by governor).
98. See Morriss, supra note 1, at 363 ("The Codes also physically overwhelmed
the Montana Legislature. Their sheer size and hurried passage meant that the usual
mechanisms for review of legislation failed completely."); see also id. at 387. There
also was a failure to examine the record from New York: "The legislature willingly
surveyed attorneys around the state, but apparently could not contact even a single
attorney in New York." Id. at 403.
99. One reason was that budget documents presented for legislative consider-
ation apparently were misleading and confusing, and continued to be so even after
the session was over. See, e.g., MONTANA OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. FISCAL ANALYST,
APPROPRIATIONS REP.: 1995 BIENNIUM (1993) at Summary-4 (implying budget had
been cut); letter from Marc Racicot, Governor of Montana, to Jim Donovan (Feb. 2,
1996) (on file with the author) ("According to Legislative and budget office figures,
during the 1993 regular session, $85 million in state spending reductions were ap-
proved and signed"). But see APPROPRIATIONS REPORT, supra, at Summary-2 to -4
(showing that budget "cuts" were made only in the House Bill 2 portion of the gen-
eral fund, and consisted entirely of $41 million in fund shifts and $46 million in
reductions in growth rate; growth outside the general fund accelerated); MONTANA
OFFICE OF BUDGET & PLAN., ALL FUND BIENNIAL APPROPRIATIONS (1994) (showing
spending increase, even after special session reductions, of nearly $400 million).
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or the Field Codes, but it would be large and would have to com-
pete for legislative time with a far greater volume of bills, in-
cluding bills of much more inherent interest to legislators.
5. Legislative Incentives
With respect to codification bills in particular, lawmakers
were and remain subject to powerful incentives to accept these
bills with relatively little critical examination. Professor Morriss
noted that adoption of the Field Codes enabled legislators to
create demand for their services.
By passing such a comprehensive set of laws, the Fourth Legis-
lature created both the need for amendments to "fix" problem
areas and the opportunity to provide such services. Addition-
ally, amendments to the Codes were far more difficult for out-
siders to decipher than laws written from scratch. Amendments
required possession of the Codes to determine what was being
amended because the titles to amendments typically provided
no information regarding their contents."
Furthermore, the party in control of the legislature is tempt-
ed to use codification as an opportunity to prove it can "accom-
plish something."10' Accordingly, it is discouraged from detailed
examination of proposals, for examination entails a risk that
such proposals may not be adopted at all, and may reveal splits
within the controlling party.
Codes also create business for the recipients of legislative
largess. The year 1895 represented an extreme example of this:
the house of representatives decided to engross all 170 pounds of
laws by hand, which justified continuation and expansion of a
formerly embarrassing bloat in legislative staff.0
On the other hand, lawmakers, then and now, face
disincentives to get too deeply into fine details when those de-
tails are not subjects of controversy or patronage. The Field
Codes were adopted with far less scrutiny than bills involving
county subdivision and school textbook selection."°
In sum: Montana may have been long married to codifica-
tion, but the lessons of the past century strongly argue that the
marriage was a mistake and a divorce long overdue. At the very
100. Morriss, supra note 1, at 363; see also id. at 408-09.
101. See id. at 408.
102. See id. at 446.
103. See id.
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least, the traditional presumption in favor of codification should
be reversed, with prospective codifiers bearing the burden of
proving that less radical reform will not suffice, and bearing the
further burden of tailoring any proposed codification to fit real-
istically with Montana conditions.
C. Assessing the Uniform Acts
1. Inherent Problems in Uniformity
Just as scholars are challenging codification and other forms
of statutory governance, they are also demythologizing those
most venerable of academic sacred cows: uniform state laws. One
major study concludes that, far from being the product of dispas-
sionate scholarship, uniform laws are largely the result of inter-
est group politics."°4 Another study argues that codification
through uniform acts is distinctly inferior as a method of balanc-
ing uniformity and diversity than ad hoc, decentralized, statuto-
ry development."0 A third study concludes that, at least in real
estate law, the costs of uniformity outweigh its benefits."° Fi-
104. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1. Obviously, these are national interest
groups, and may not even reflect Montana special interests, much less the Montana
public interest.
105. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous
Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON.
INQUIRY 464 (1996) (spontaneous legislative adoption of limited liability company
statutes without federal or uniform law commission intervention shows that uniformi-
ty appears to extent efficient and diversity remains to extent efficient).
106. Michael H. Schill focuses on the advisability of federal intervention in the
real estate finance field, but as he makes clear, many of his comments are equally
applicable to uniform state laws. See Schill, supra note 1. Professor Schill concludes:
Economic efficiency rationales for federal preemption are quite weak.
Spillovers attributable to different state mortgage laws are small and could
be eliminated at modest cost. Transaction costs and lost scale economies are
also likely to be quite small. Furthermore, differences among states justify
customized legal rules with respect to the law governing the relationship
between mortgagors and mortgagees . . . . [W]e should not automatically
link the development of national markets to uniform national law. In some
instances, the efficiency gains of uniform law may provide a strong justifi-
cation for sacrificing diversity. In other instances, such as mortgage foreclo-
sure law, uniformity will generate few benefits.
Diverse state laws often reflect the health of our political system,
rather than its infirmity. Different state laws may demonstrate competition
among jurisdictions for the set of public policies that will best meet the
needs and aspirations of their citizens. Diversity may also reflect the flexi-
bility and experimentation made possible by decentralized government insti-
tutions. Perhaps even more importantly, diverse state laws may demon-
strate that states continue to function as meaningful forums for political
participation and action.
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nally, an analysis of two uniform land acts concludes that .the
acts were based on an inadequate understanding of the market
and on empirically false assumptions. 7
In light of such conclusions, the legislature should reconsider
seriously before adopting additional uniform laws-at least in
the area of real property.
2. Specific Problems With the UCIOA and UCA
What is true for uniform laws in general is especially true
for the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) and
the Uniform Condominium Act (UCA) in particular. Although
those measures have some excellent provisions,'" taken as a
whole they are far too global and, with some exceptions,"° too
prescriptive.
For example, while the UOA is applicable only to those con-
dominiums whose developers elect it, the UCIOA applies to all
"common interest communities," and the definition of the term
"community(ies)" is exceedingly broad. Moreover, there is no
right to opt out.1 The UCA is less sweeping, but it still ap-
plies to all condominiums, and the definition of condominium is
broader than in traditional statutes, for there is no horizontal
property requirement."'
The hubris of the drafters left both uniform acts burdened
by a horde of immutable or quasi-mutable rules, crafted to im-
pose national uniformity without regard for local conditions."2
Thus, under both laws, variation by agreement is prohibited
unless the act specifically permits it-a disturbing reversal of the
usual assumption in American private law."3 Residential pur-
Id. at 1319-20.
107. See Smith, supra note 1.
108. I recommend that Montana enact some of them. See, e.g., infra text accom-
panying note 121.
109. Some of the provisions of the uniform acts are default rather than immu-
table rules. See, e.g., UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-105, 7 pt. 1
U.LA 522-24 (1997) (content of declaration); id. § 2-107, at 529-30 (common ele-
ments and voting); id. § 2-108, at 532 (limited common elements).
110. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-201, 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 505
(1997). Cf id. § 1-103(7), at 479 (defining "Common Interest Community"); id. § 1-
103(23), at 481 (defining "Planned Community").
111. See UNiF. CoNDOMINIUM ACT § 1-103(7), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 215 (1997):
-'Condominium' means real estate, portions of which are designated for separate
ownership and the remainder of which is designated for common ownership solely by
the owners of those portions."
112. Or worse: See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1 (uniform laws crafted in
defiance of local conditions to serve special interests).
113. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-104, 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 489-90
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chasers have no right to waive the public offering statement.114
Escrow applies to all sales; there is no alternative course."
The uniform acts even presume to rewrite the warranty, dis-
claimer and punitive damage laws of adopting states."'
The uniform acts contain portions seemingly designed to be
in aid of agreement rather than purely regulatory, but even
those provisions are sometimes oppressive. For example, a
nonmerchant unit owner reselling his home is subject, not mere-
ly to common law disclosure requirements, but must, without
request, give the purchaser a massive amount of paperwork.17
Such a requirement is almost certainly at odds with the tenden-
cy toward legal informality characteristic of Montana and many
other western states.118
Professor James Charles Smith has made the following com-
ments with respect to two other uniform real estate laws:
The drafters of the ULTA and the USLTA were ambitious,
seeking to overhaul a good many long-embedded property law
doctrines. They sought to purge the law of ancient rules per-
ceived no longer to serve the needs of modern markets. In so
doing, they went too far. Instead of focusing on a small number
of revisions to rules that were both obsolete and harmful,119
they painted with a broad brush, fashioning a code decreeing
(1997); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-104, 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 222 (1997).
114. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 4-101(a), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 610
(1997); UNIF. CONDOMINIuM ACT § 4-101(a), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 329 (1997).
115. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 4-110, 7 pt. 1 U.LA 626
(1997); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 4-110, 7 pt. 2 U.LA 349 (1997); cf MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 70-23-201 to -206 (1995).
116. See the standard warranty rules of UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP
ACT §§ 4-113 to -116, 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 630-36 (1997), and UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT §§
4-113 to -116, 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 55-61 (1997). Such rules may squeeze out the healthy
development of a private warranty market. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1174. The
strict disclaimer provisions especially are at odds with the rules in some states, e.g.,
Copland v. Nathaniel, 624 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1995); Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 740 P.2d
1022 (Idaho 1987). See also UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHP ACT § 4-117, 7 pt.
1 U.L.A. 637 (1997) (special punitive damage provision); cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221 (1995) (applying different test).
117. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 4-109(a), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
623-25 (1997); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 4-109(a), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 347 (1997). The
POA provides some of this paperwork. See UNiF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT
§ 4-109(b), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 625 (1997); UNiF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 4-109(b), 7 pt. 2
U.L.A. 347 (1997).
118. See Natelson, Running, supra note 1, at 90; cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-
613 (1995) (much simpler disclosure requirements, enforced by right to cancel). Ironi-
cally, some other uniform laws pertaining to real estate adopt an anti-formalist bias.
See Smith, supra note 1, at 1175. This may be explained by interest-group involve-
ment in the drafting process. See generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1.
119. I.e., the specific reform process recommended in this article.
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sweeping changes to the property laws of any state that chose
enactment....
In essence, the reformers aimed at too many targets. In
two categories, ammunition was sent toward the wrong marks.
First, they assumed that direct legislative action to solve a
problem is preferable to market-based solutions, without mak-
ing a careful examination as to the necessity for and costs of
market intervention. The potential for solutions by other mar-
ket institutions was overlooked. [For example w]ith respect to
implied warranties of quality for the sale of new homes, the
Acts mandated the use of a single standard, depriving the par-
ties of the freedom of choosing to make their own bargain. This
choice neglected the emerging response of the home-building
industry in creating a system of private warranties, spearhead-
ed by the HOW program....
Second, in identifying problem areas, the Acts' architects
disregarded the extent to which private ordering by parties, in
written real property agreements, replace [sic] implied legal
rules, greatly diminishing the importance of the implied
rules.' °
Every single one of those comments could be applied with equal
force to the UCA and the UCIOA.
V. REFORMING THE UOA
The basic approach of the present UOA-a safe harbor with
a few prescriptive rules, default rules and disclosure require-
ments-is probably the correct approach. The statute offers secu-
rity in an area in which security is prized (property rights), but
in which there is relatively little Montana common law authority
(condominium law). One measure of success is that despite
Montana's sparse population, the condominium form has
achieved surprising popularity in this state, while the
amount of reported litigation has been quite small.' Moreover,
120. Smith, supra note 1, at 1184-85.
121. The more heavily populated counties vary greatly in the number of condo-
miniums. Gallatin County (pop. 50,463) has 188 condominium subdivisions, with Flat-
head County (pop. 59,218) not far behind with 159. On the other hand, Lake County
(pop. 21,041) has only two; Ravalli County (pop. 25,010) has 15; and Missoula Coun-
ty, the state's second most populous (pop. 78,687) only 38. Confirming the success of
the statute is one of Yellowstone County's leading condominium practitioners. Tele-
phone Interview with Carol Hardy, Esq., (Aug. 8, 1996).
122. Cases on condominium law decided by the Montana Supreme Court, or
where condominiums are parties, include Big Sky Hidden Village Owners Ass'n, Inc.
v. Hidden Village, Inc., 276 Mont. 68, 915 P.2d 845 (1996); Edgewater Townhouse
Homeowner's Ass'n v. Holtman, 256 Mont. 182, 845 P.2d 1224 (1993); First Western
1997]
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the UOA has left developers free to craft somewhat different,
though functionally similar, alternatives to meet evolving market
demand.'
In this Part, I examine nine fundamental problems in the
UOA. In each case, I state the nature of the problem, determine
the reasons for the difficulty, explain the current meaning of the
law, and recommend appropriate changes. The problems exam-
ined include: (A) the architectural structure of the condomini-
um-whether units must be enclosed within walls; (B) the odd
mandated structure of the governing documents; (C) whether,
and how, the condominium declaration can be amended; (D)
whether leasehold condominiums are permitted; (E) questions
regarding association collection of common expenses; (F) ques-
tions regarding liens for debts owed to third parties; (G) associa-
tion representation of unit owners in law suits; (H) questions
pertaining to termination of the condominium regime; and (I)
elimination of needless government regulation.
A. Architectural Structure
When most people think of "condominium," they think of
apartment houses and other multiple-family dwellings. In the
Puerto Rican prototype, this was the only kind of condominium
permitted."' A similar limitation was carried over to the FHA
Model Statute. 5 Technically, however, "condominium" is a
form of ownership, not a form of use or architectural structure.
Accordingly, the Montana drafters permitted condominium units
devoted to any kind of independent use.' Today a fair number
Federal Say. Bank v. Lence, 255 Mont. 7, 839 P.2d 1277 (1992); Board of Directors
of Edelweiss Owners' Ass'n v. McIntosh, 251 Mont. 144, 822 P.2d 1080 (1991); Asso-
ciation of Unit Owners of Deer Lodge Condominium v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., 245
Mont. 64, 798 P.2d 1018 (1990); State ex rel. Boyne USA, Inc. v. District Court, 228
Mont. 314, 742 P.2d 464 (1987); Jordan v. Elizabethan Manor, 181 Mont. 424, 593
P.2d 1049 (1979).
123. See, e.g., Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Home-
stead Townhouses, supra note 32; Covenants and Restrictions for Bridger Creek Sub-
division, supra note 32; Articles of Association of Borchers Resort Association of Area
Three, microformed on Recep. No. 235627, July 22, 1977 (Lake County, Montana,
Clerk and Recorder's Office).
124. Ley Para establecer el Rdgimen de la Propiedad Horizontal [Law to estab-
lish the Horizontal Property Regime], art. 2, 1958 P.R. Laws 104 (provisions of stat-
ute "aplicables s6lo al edificio o casa de apartamientos .... " ["applicable only to the
building or apartment house . . .]).
125. See FHA MODEL STATUTE, § 2(a) (1965) (referring to separately owned parts
of the property as an "apartment").
126. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(15) (1995).
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of Montana condominiums serve purposes other than residen-
tial. 127 However, all of these purposes are served within walls.
In some states, condominiums include units that are not
necessarily defined by walls: single family homes within air
space blocks, mobile homes, boat slips, grain silos, and camp-
sites." s Could Montana condominium units be wholly or partly
out-of-doors? If not, outdoor uses are not permitted under the
UOA, and horizontal property is a de facto condition of condo-
miniums in Montana: units cannot be held ab inferis usque ad
coelum, as they can in states with more modern statutes. 9
An argument in favor of a less restrictive interpretation of
the UOA's definition of unit is that the statutory language "in-
cluding one or more rooms" may be optional: it does not require
one or more rooms. Buttressing this position is the fact that the
term "apartment" in the Model Act was changed to "unit" in the
Montana version. Moreover, the statute implies that "land" can
be within a unit.30
However, these observations are outweighed by several to
the contrary. First, the phrase "including one or more rooms
occupying one or more floors or a part or parts thereof' is a re-
strictive one; it is not set off by commas from "part of the proper-
ty," as it is in the "apartment" definition in the Model Act. Thus,
the reference to rooms limits the part of the property being de-
127. See, e.g., Declaration for the Auto Park Condominium, Phase 1, microformed
on Doc. No. 193612, microfilm 104 of Misc., p. 2247, Jan. 6, 1989 (Gallatin County,
Montana, Clerk and Recorder's Office) (storage rooms); Declaration for the Trades
Guild Condominium, microformed on Doc. No. 145901, Book 89 of Misc., p. 3254, Oct.
8, 1985 (Gallatin County, Montana, Clerk and Recorder's Office) (commercial business
purposes); Declaration and Bylaws for the Aircraft Condominium, microformed on
Doc. No. 136619, Book 86 of Misc., p. 4377, Mar. 4, 1985 (Gallatin County, Montana,
Clerk and Recorder's Office) (aircraft storage facility); Declaration and Bylaws for the
Gilkerson Warehouses Condominium, microformed on Dec. No. 146658, Book 89 of
Misc., p. 4315, Oct. 28, 1985 (Gallatin County, Montana, Clerk and Recorder's Office)
(storage); Declaration of Unit Ownership and Statement of Covenants and Bylaws of
Association of Unit Owners of 1993 Office Building Condominiums, microformed on
Recep. No. 94187-09000, July 6, 1994 (Flathead County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office) (professional office and commercial purposes); Bylaws and Declara-
tion Under Unit Ownership Act Pertaining to The Palace Condominium Ass'n,
microformed on Dec. No. 9426622, microfilm 429, p. 121, Nov. 16, 1994 (Missoula
County, Montana, Clerk and Recorder's Office) (mixed commercial and residential);
Declaration of Condominium for The Ashberry Condominium, microformed on Doc.
No. 8907134, microfilm 293, p. 2249, May 19, 1989 (Missoula County, Montana,
Clerk and Recorder's Office) (commercial, office, service or retail).
128. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 32.
129. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.103(10), (24) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997);
UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-103(7), (25), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 215, 217 (1997)
130. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(8)(a) (1995).
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scribed. Second, several other parts of the UOA clearly contem-
plate that there will be a building on every condominium proper-
ty. '3 For example, all declarations are to be accompanied by
floor plans;'32 and although a condominium may cover more
than one building, those buildings are to be "multiple unit"
buildings, not single family ones.'33 Thus, "land" within a unit
must mean land within walls, such as a basement. Case author-
ity from Ohio-admittedly construing a slightly more restrictive
statute-supports the position that outdoor units are not possible
in such circumstances.' 34
To this requirement that units be within walls, there seems
to be one exception: When the declaration has been filed, but the
contemplated apartment has not been constructed, a condomini-
um is perceived to exist. In that event, the unit is apparently
floating in the location where the potential apartment will be
built. 13'
131. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(8) (1995): 'General common ele-
ments,' unless otherwise provided in a declaration or by consent of all the unit own-
ers, means: (a) the land on which the building is located, except any portion thereof
included in a unit or made a limited common element by the declaration..
(emphasis added).
132. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-306 (1995):
Floor plans recorded with declaration--certification. (1) Floor plans of the
building described in a declaration shall be recorded simultaneously with
the declaration. The floor plans shall show the layout of each unit, includ-
ing the unit designation, location and dimensions of each unit, and the
common areas to which each has access.
133. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(2) (1995): "Building' means a multiple-
unit building or buildings comprising a part of the property."
However, a number of horizontal duplex-residence condominiums exist in Mon-
tana, especially in Ravalli County. In that case, the unit exists within the residence
and the adjacent yard is typically a limited common element. See, e.g., Declaration
Under Unit Ownership Act for Canyon View Estates, microformed on Doc. No.
379736, Book 207 of Deeds, p. 873, Mar. 23, 1994 (Ravalli County, Montana, Clerk
and Recorder's Office); Enabling Declaration Establishing a Plan for Condominium
Ownership for Maplewood Court Condominiums, microformed on Doc. No. 380513,
Book 208 of Deeds, p. 158, Apr. 12, 1994 (Ravalli County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office); Enabling Declaration Establishing a Plan for Condominium Owner-
ship for Foxfield Condominium, microformed on Doc. No. 357064, Book 198 of Deeds,
p. 655, June 30, 1992 (Ravalli County, Montana, Clerk and Recorder's Office).
134. Prestwick Landowners' Ass'n v. Underhill, 429 N.E. 2d 1191 (Ohio 1980)
(construing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5311.01, 5311.03 (Banks-Baldwin 1980)).
135. Thus, under MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-301(1) (1995), a declaration may
only be filed if it contains "a description of the land . . .on which the building is or
is to be located . . . " (emphasis added). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-306(2)
(1995) (allowing floor plans to be fied before completion of construction); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 70-23-201(1) (1995) (stating that units may be conveyed or leased prior
to the completion of construction of the building within which such unit is located).
Cf. Fairways Villas Venture v. Fairway Villas Condominium Ass'n, 815 S.W.2d 912
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The statutory restriction to condominiums-within-walls
seems to be inappropriate for Montana. The state's tourist indus-
try, for instance, would seem to offer great potential for camp-
ground condominiums, boat slip condominiums, single family
resort homes, and similar innovations. Further, the state's rela-
tive poverty argues for permitting mobile home condomini-
ums. 35 The legislature can provide for such uses by amending
the statutory definition of "unit" to delete references to floors and
other interior features. 37 This change would end the horizontal
property requirement. The condominium declaration and any
incorporated plans would define the boundaries of units. Given
the safe-harbor nature of the UOA, purported condominiums
whose units are not defined by interior features may still qualify
as valid common law subdivisions.13
B. The Governing Documents
I think it is a safe guess that if a committee composed of a
random selection of American lawyers were given the task of
designing a condominium regime without benefit of statute, that
committee would prepare the following documents:
(Tex. 1991) (units held to include unbuilt apartments). See also Jordan v. Elizabethan
Manor, 181 Mont. 424, 593 P.2d 1049 (1979) (suggesting the same result).
136. Telephone Interview with Carol Hardy, Esq. (Aug. 9, 1996).
137. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-103(25), 7 pt. 2 U.LA.. 217 (1997):
Unit means a physical portion of the condominium designated for separate owner-
ship or occupancy, the boundaries of which are described pursuant to Section 2-
105(a)(5)." Under § 2-105(a)(5) of the Act, the declaration defines the boundaries of
each unit.
Accompanying such a change should be an amendment of the Montana defini-
tion of "general common element" from a list of building characteristics (which it is
now) to a simple statement such as "common elements means all portions of a con-
dominium other than the units." See UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-103(4), 7 pt. 2
U.LA 215 (1997).
138. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. For an example of a subdivision
now outside the UOA but one that might qualify as a condominium under a broader
definition, see Articles of Association of Borchers Resort Association of Area Three,
supra note 115 (resort buildings on microlots owned individually, surrounded by com-
mon properties, apparently owned in common). For an example of a purported Mon-
tana Condominium that includes land outside walls, see First Amended Declaration
of Restrictions for Stanford Court Condominium, microformed on Doc. No. 1492125,
Book 1324 of Misc., p. 2789, July 21, 1988 (Yellowstone County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office). Developers use the latter sort of "condominium" in Yellowstone
County to take advantage of a relaxed interpretation of state subdivision law by the
Yellowstone County Commissioners. Telephone Interview with Carol Hardy, Esq.,
Aug. 9, 1996; Telephone Interview with Howard Sumner, real estate broker (Aug. 8,
1996).
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* a set of covenants and other rules defining property
rights, which would be recorded in the real estate re-
cords of each county;
* articles of incorporation or articles of association to
govern the POA, which would be more or less along the
lines contemplated for membership, mutual benefit
corporations under a typical state non-profit corporation
law; and
* a set of bylaws for the POA, also more or less along the
lines contemplated for membership, mutual benefit
corporations under the same state non-profit corporation
law.
The committee would likely permit the board of directors of the
association to issue housekeeping rules in addition to the forego-
ing.
In non-condominium subdivisions, this is pretty much the
approach most lawyers take. Property rights are defined in docu-
ments called "Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions," recorded
with other real estate records; the association is governed by
articles and bylaws." 9
However, the UOA did not originate in a random committee
of American lawyers. It originated in the FHA Model Act, which
in turn was essentially copied from then Puerto Rican horizontal
property law. Accordingly, the UOA largely reflects the expecta-
tions, not of the common law tradition, but of the Puerto Rican
civil law tradition-and of the traditions of civil law countries
from which Puerto Rico borrowed the concept."4
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the odd configuration
of the governing documents mandated by statute. The 1958
Puerto Rican Horizontal Property Act provided for recording of
an escritura pdblica,' which was to set forth basic information
about the regime's property structure. The organization of the
association was to be outlined in a Reglamento, or set of rules,
which would be inserted in or appended to the escritura pdblica
and could be altered only by a three-quarters vote by association
members." Unfortunately, the FHA translated the term
Reglamento as "bylaws" in its model statute, even though the
Reglamento bore little relationship to corporate bylaws as that
139. See, e.g., the "townhouse" documents cited supra note 32.
140. See also supra Part III(B).
141. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 1292 (1968).
142. See id. § 1293, 12 9 3 (a).
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term is understood on the mainland United States." The term
was carried over into the UOA without taking into consideration
the differences in United States corporate and organizational
practice. "
Traces of the close connection between escritura pablica and
reglamento in the Puerto Rican law can be found in the contents
the statute specifies for the declaration and bylaws. Thus, the
UOA requires the declaration to define various matters of prop-
erty, such as the description of the land and the location of the
units, but also requires the declaration to specify the name of a
person to receive service of process--an item American lawyers
are more likely to place in corporate or association docu-
ments." Similarly, the UOA authorizes the bylaws to define
not merely association governance, but also various land cove-
nants, such as the assessment covenant and land use restric-
tions. In addition, the UOA sets a supermajority requirement
for amendment of the bylaws-seventy-five percent of the unit
owners (whether or not voting) 47 -so high that it is more ap-
propriate for land covenants than for most corporate bylaws,
which are usually rules of corporate procedure.Y Moreover, the
UOA makes no provision for the association to have articles of
incorporation or association.
There are several difficulties with matters as they stand.
One is that governing documents so different from what most
American lawyers would expect are likely to be a fertile field for
143. The Puerto Rican Reglamento is more analogous to the titulo constitutivo of
Spanish law than to "bylaws" as the term is understood in this country. (The provi-
sion in Spanish law may be found in Sobre Propiedad Horizontal [Regarding Horizon-
tal Property], art. 5., 1969 P.R. Laws 49). However, any latent rigidities in the titulo
constitutivo are compensated for by the fact that in Spain a simple majority has
much fuller freedom to control its subdivision than under most American laws. See
id., art. 6. The Spanish law is set forth and discussed in MARIANO FERNANDEZ
MARTIN-GRANIZO, LA LEY DE PROPIEDAD HORIZONTAL EN EL DERECHO ESPAiROL [HORI-
ZONTAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM] 12-13 (1983).
144. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-307 (1995). For another criticism of recording
bylaws and treating them as if they were constitutive documents, see Norman Geis,
Beyond the Condominium: The Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act, 17 REAL
EST. L.J. 757, 770 (1982).
145. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-301 (1995) with MONT. CODE ANN. §
35-2-213(1)(c)(ii) (1995) (providing that the articles of incorporation of a nonprofit
corporation must include the name of the registered agent).
146. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-308 (1995).
147. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-307(3) (1995).
148. Cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-2-230 (1995) (requiring a majority of the mem-
bership to amend most nonprofit corporation bylaws or two-thirds of the votes cast,
whichever is less).
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confusion. Certainly, Montana practitioners seem uncertain
about what belongs in the declaration and what belongs in the
bylaws. In Flathead County, for example, most condominium
developments are based on scanty declarations and more com-
plete bylaws; the bylaws generally include the assessment cove-
nant and use restrictions. In Gallatin County, on the other hand,
the prevailing practice is for condominiums to be based on highly
detailed declarations, filled with covenants and other property
matters, supplemented with relatively modest bylaws. In
Missoula County and other locales, one finds both approaches in
the same community. 49 The Flathead County practice of a
small declaration and larger bylaws probably reflects the intent
of the UOA, but the Gallatin County practice is more consistent
with that followed in other western states, such as Colorado,
whence it may have been borrowed.'
Another difficulty with the current statute is that incorpo-
rated associations must comply with both the Montana nonprofit
corporation law and with the quite different rules in the UOA.
Other problems include the UOA's excessively high threshold for
amendment of the bylaws,' and its failure to provide for
amendment of the declaration by anything less than unanimi-
ty.1
5 2
The legislature should alter the sections of the UOA pertain-
ing to governing documents. The legislature should be guided by
the principle that matters likely to be more central to the unit
149. Compare Declaration of Condominium Under Unit Ownership Act Pertaining
the Clearview Village, microformed on Doc. No. 411164, microfilm 106, p. 1449, Oct.
28, 1977 (Missoula County, Montana, Clerk and Recorder's Office) (three page decla-
ration, excluding exhibits) and Declaration under Unit Ownership Act Pertaining to
The Palace, supra note 127 (text of declaration consumes two pages) with Declaration
of Condominium for Panorama Park Condominiums, microformed on Doc. No.
9500798, microfilm 433, p. 11, Jan. 12, 1995 (Missoula County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office) (48 page declaration) and Declaration of Condominium for The
Ashberry Condominium, supra note 127 (40 pages).
See also Enabling Declaration Establishing a Plan for Condominium Ownership
for Foxfield Condominium, supra note 133 (use restrictions in declaration) and By-
laws of Regency South Building Condominium, microformed on Doc. No. 343811,
Book 193 of Deeds, p. 61, Apr. 12, 1991 (Ravalli County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office) (use restrictions in bylaws).
150. A typical Colorado condominium declaration is cited infra note 167. The
Gallatin County practice (as noted in the text, by no means limited to Gallatin
County) is defended by a Yellowstone County practitioner on the grounds that prop-
erty definitions should be the most difficult of matters to amend, and the declaration
is often more, and always at least, as difficult to amend as the bylaws. Telephone
Interview with Carol Hardy, Esq. (Aug. 9, 1996).
151. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
152. See infra Part V(C).
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purchasers' bargain-generally those thought of as "property
rights"--should be inserted in the declaration (which should be
difficult to amend), while lesser matters should be placed in
more easily amendable subsidiary documents. Thus, the statute
should require the declaration to include property descriptions of
units and common elements, the estate by which they are held,
the purpose of the subdivision, any future interests, any
servitudes (including the assessment covenant), an amendment
procedure and the like-all matters generally recorded under
good real estate practice. The statute should specify that subsid-
iary documents, such as the articles and bylaws, should desig-
nate corporate procedures and an agent for service of pro-
cess-matters normally inserted in corporate articles and bylaws.
Only the declaration should have to be recorded. Because of its
property-oriented subject matter, the declaration is likely to be
the longer document.
The bylaws, stripped of its property subject matter, should
be governed by provisions of, or contain provisions closely analo-
gous to those of the Montana Nonprofit Corporation Act,"5
which, of course, incorporated associations must comply with
anyway. The UOA's additional requirements for POA bylaws are
needlessly troublesome and should be repealed. 5'
C. Amendment of Declaration and Bylaws
The UOA contains no procedure for amendment of the decla-
ration. Yet the UOA does contemplate that the declaration shall
be amendable. For example, there are provisions for amending
the floor plans' and replacing the agent for service of pro-
cess." In the case of the latter, the amendment is to be made
by "the association of unit owners,"'57 presumably by a majority
153. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-2-213 to -233 (1995). A revised UOA could re-
quire associations to be incorporated or allow unincorporated associations to exist,
but require them to follow the internal procedures mandated by the Nonprofit Corpo-
ration Act.
154. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-308(1) (1995) (requiring that the board
consist of unit owners, which disqualifies non-owning spouses and dispassionate tie-
breakers for small condominiums). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-2-415 (1995)
(stating that directors must be individuals, but articles or bylaws may prescribe
other qualifications); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-308(1) (1995) (limiting terms to three
years); cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-2-419 (1995) (permitting terms up to five years).
155. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-306(2) (1995).
156. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-902 (1995).
157. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-902 (1995):
Change of agent for service of process. If the association of unit owners
1997] 529
530 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
vote."
Several factors lead to the conclusion that under the current
state of the law, condominium declarations can be amended only
by a unanimous vote of the unit owners, at least in absence of a
declaration clause to the contrary. First, a condominium declara-
tion is a contract to which the declarant and all unit purchasers
are parties. Of course, in absence of prior agreement to the con-
trary, all parties must agree before a contract can be altered.'59
The fact that some of the terms of the declaration are covenants
running with the land only strengthens this conclusion."6
Moreover, the UOA specifically requires unanimous votes for
altering certain specified terms of the declaration, including the
percentage of each owner's interest in the common elements, 6'
alterations to a unit that would impair the value of the property
as a whole," 2 and additions to common expenses."
Many declarations contain clauses permitting amendment by
a margin less than unanimity. At common law, such clauses are
permissible," except as limited by statute."
wishes to designate a person other than the one named in the declaration
to receive service of process in the cases provided in 70-23-901, it shall
record an amendment to the declaration. The amendment shall be certified
by the presiding officer and the secretary of the association of unit owners
and shall state the name of the successor with his residence or place of
business as required by 70-23-301(7) and that the person named in the
amendment was designated by resolution duly adopted by the association of
unit owners.
158. Although the UOA does not explicitly state that association decisions are
normally made by a majority, that is the implication of several provisions. See, e.g.,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(10) (1995) (definition of majority), § 70-23-§308(2)
(quorum presumed to be majority), § 70-23-612(1) (majority may insure building), §
70-23-613 (disclosure when a single entity controls a majority), and § 70-23-613(1)(b)
and (c) (adoption or repeal of bylaws and administrative regulations by majority).
159. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 611.
160. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
161. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-403(2) (1995).
162. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-502 (1995):
Certain work on unit by owner prohibited. A unit owner shall make no
repair or alteration or perform any other work on his unit which would
jeopardize the soundness or safety of the property, reduce the value thereof,
or impair any easement or hereditament unless the consent of all the other
unit owners affected is first obtained.
163. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(4Xb) (1995).
164. See, e.g., Taormina Theosophical Community, Inc. v. Silver, 140 Cal. App.
3d 964 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
165. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text (unanimity required if
amendment changes unit boundaries, adds to common expenses, or allows structural
unit alternations).
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Condominium statutes in other jurisdictions specify
supermajorities for amendment of the declaration, which may
serve as immutable rules or merely as default rules when the
declaration is silent.1" The declaration may supplement ap-
proval by a supermajority of unit owners by requiring approval
by supermajorities of the unit mortgagees.1"7
Despite the lack of statutory authorization, many Montana
declarations purport to permit amendment by less than unanimi-
ty. The most common requirements are seventy-five percent of
unit owners, or successive votes of a majority and seventy-five
percent."6 Still, some declarations have no amendment proce-
166. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 11-103(c) (1996) (amendment must
be approved in writing by a least 80% of ownership interests); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5311.05(BX9) (Banks-Baldwin 1980) (not less than 75%); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT §
2-117(a), 7 U.L.A. 214 (1997) (67% or such larger majority as declaration specifies);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.110(1)(a) (West 1997) (default rule is two-thirds, but not more
than four-fifths for condominiums created after April 1, 1992).
167. See, e.g., Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of the
Majorca Condominiums, microformed on Doc. No. 030413, microfilm 1770, p. 328,
Oct. 17, 1978 (Denver County, Colorado, Clerk's Office) § 31(b):
Any provision contained in this Declaration may be amiended or additional
provisions may be added ... by the recording of a written instrument ...
executed by the Owners ... of Units representing an aggregate ownership
interest of seventy-five percent (75%), or more, of the General Common
Elements and not less than one hundred percent (100%) of the first Mort-
gagees ....
Cf FHA Form 1401, widely copied among drafters of the declarations of common
interest subdivisions that do not qualify as condominiums (sets a figure of ninety
percent approval to amend during the first twenty years, and seventy-five percent
thereafter).
168. See, e.g., Declaration of Condominium for Panorama Park Condominiums,
supra note 149 (75%); Amended Declaration of Condominium Under Unit Ownership
Act for Missoula Community Physicians Center #2, microformed on Doc. No. 9021415,
microfilm 322, p. 1774, Dec. 19, 1990 (Missoula County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office) (75%); Declaration of Condominium Under Unit Ownership Act Per-
taining the Clearview Village, supra note 149 (35 of 46 units, viz., 75%); Declaration
Under Unit Ownership Act Pertaining to The Palace, supra note 127 (75%); Declara-
tion of Condominium for The Ashberry Condominium, supra note 127 (75%); Declara-
tion Under Unit Ownership Act for Canyon View Estates, supra note 133; Declara-
tion for the Auto Park Condominium, Phase I, supra note 127 (successive votes of
majority and 75%); Declaration for the Willowbrook Condominium, microformed on
Doc. No. 316248, microfilm 158 of Misc., p. 3787, Dec. 12, 1995 (Gallatin County,
Montana, Clerk and Recorder's Office) (same).
But see Declaration of Unit Ownership of 1993 Office Building Condominiums,
supra note 127 (unanimous vote of four unit owners); Enabling Declaration Estab-
lishing a Plan for Condominium Ownership for Maplewood Court Condominiums,
supra note 133 (same); Enabling Declaration Establishing a Plan for Condominium
Ownership for Regency South Building Condominium, microformed on Doc. No.
343810, Book 193 of Deeds, p. 60, Apr. 12, 1991 (Ravalli County, Montana, Clerk
and Recorder's Office) (unanimous vote of three unit owners); Enabling Declaration
Establishing a Plan for Condominium Ownership for Foxfield Condominium, supra
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dure at all.'69
Reducing the amendment requirement from unanimity to a
supermajority does not invite an easy disregard of property
rights. The necessary percentages usually are based upon the
number of all owners, not upon the number of those in atten-
dance at a particular association meeting. In practice it may be
impossible to obtain any response-positive or negative-from
many owners, even by mail or by proxy, especially where those
owners are absentee landlords. Hence, an amendment may fail
simply because some owners do not respond despite assiduous
efforts to contact them.1
70
The UOA should be altered to allow the declaration to per-
mit amendment by less than a unanimous vote. The UOA should
set forth both a minimum supermajority, applicable irrespective
of a declaration clause to the contrary, and a default rule appli-
cable if the declaration is silent. It is difficult to state a priori
what amendment percentages the statute should adopt. As to the
default rule, seventy-five percent may be appropriate because
note 133 (unanimous vote of ten unit owners); Declaration of Unit Ownership of Har-
bor Village Condominium, microformed on Recep. No. 92289-11000, Oct. 15, 1992
(Flathead County, Montana, Clerk and Recorder's Office) (75 percent vote of owners
followed by majority vote of Flathead County Commissioners); Declaration of Unit
Ownership for Yellowstone Townhomes, microformed on Doc. No. 1675197, microfilm
1392, p. 1250, Mar. 17, 1993 (Yellowstone County, Montana, Clerk and Recorder's
Office) (unanimous vote of 12 unit owners and mortgagees).
169. See, e.g., Revised Declaration of Unit Ownership of "The Narrows,"
microformed on Recep. No. 339937, July 9, 1992 (Lake County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office) (consisting of six units).
170. California's Common Interest Development Act (which applies to condomini-
ums), appearing at CAL. Civ. CODE § 1356(c) (West 1997), provides a mechanism for
dealing with this situation. It permits the association, or "the owner of any separate
interest" to "petition the superior court of the county in which the common interest
development is located for an order reducing the percentage of the affirmative votes
necessary for such an amendment." The statute further provides that the court may,
but is not required to grant the petition if it finds all of the following-
(1) The petitioner has given not less than 15 days written notice of the
court hearing to all members of the association, to any mortgagee of a
mortgage or beneficiary of a deed of trust who is entitled to notice under
the terms of the declaration, and to the city, county, or city and county in
which the common interest development is located that is entitled to notice
under the terms of the declaration.
(2) Balloting on the proposed amendment was conducted in accordance with
all applicable provisions of the governing documents.
(3) A reasonably diligent effort was made to permit all eligible members to
vote on the proposed amendment.
(4) Owners having more than 50 percent of the votes . . . voted in favor of
the amendment . . .
(5) The amendment is reasonable ....
CAL. CIV. CODE 1356(c) (West 1997).
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this percentage represents the dominant practice in Montana,
and existing practice is a good predictor of what a declarant
would have done if he had thought about the issue.
On the other hand, the immutable minimum should be a
good deal lower than seventy-five percent, to permit freedom of
contract and encourage experimentation. A recent study con-
cludes that the approval percentage best for optimal decision-
making declines as the number of decision-makers rises-and
that for groups of 120 or more, a supermajority requirement
higher than sixty percent is never optimal.171 On the other
hand, risk aversion attendant on amending documents central to
the condominium regime argues for high supermajorities.'72
Moreover, a study of numerous condominium documents from
several other states found that supermajority thresholds for
capital improvements tend to rise with the number of units.'73
Still other analyses suggest that optimal supermajorities are
different for different kinds of condominiums 74 and for differ-
ent kinds of owners.'75
A reasonable alteration in the UOA, therefore, would be to
permit the declaration to specify an amendment percentage of
sixty percent or more of the total ownership interest (not merely
of those present at a meeting), and to adopt as a default rule
seventy-five percent of the total membership interest. Readers
who fear that a sixty percent minimum is too low should recall
the policing forces of the market: Both amendments and amend-
ment procedures will be constrained by the judgment of prospec-
tive mortgagees as well as by the declarant and the unit owners.
As for the bylaws, the UOA specifies an amendment
supermajority of seventy-five percent.'76 This figure can be jus-
171. See Nitzan & Paroush, supra note 1. The widespread use in Montana of
default rules of 75% or higher is consistent with this thesis, because Montana condo-
miniums tend to be small. Developments of more than 36 units are relatively rare.
Telephone Interview with Carol Hardy, Esq. (Aug. 9, 1996).
172. For the effect of risk aversion on optimal majority rules, see Bengt-Arne
Wickstrom, Optimal Majorities for Decisions of Varying Importance, 48 PUBLIC
CHOICE 273 (1986).
173. See Barzel & Sass, supra note 1, at 767.
174. See id (larger supermajorities used in residential condominiums than in
commercial or resort condominiums, and where unit owners' interests are diverse
[mixed use subdivisions; widely disparate units and assessments] than when they are
relatively uniform).
175. See id. Similarly, I have argued that supermajorities among owners who
reside in their units ought to be higher than among owner-landlords. See NATELSON,
POA, supra note 1, at 623.
176. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-307(3) (1995).
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tified insofar as the bylaws include property law matters but is
unreasonably high for altering such procedural items as how to
call membership meetings. 77 At least as to such items, the pro-
cedure needs to be made more flexible. As recommended above,
property rights can be protected through legislation adopting the
Gallatin County practice of placing property rules in the declara-
tion.
One reasonable course would be to permit the bylaws them-
selves to specify how they shall be amended, which is the solu-
tion adopted by the Uniform Condominium Act.178 A slightly
stricter procedure would be to permit amendment by (i) the less-
er of a majority of the membership voting power or two-thirds of
all votes cast or (ii) by such higher majority as may be prescribed
by the proposed amendment or by the condominium's constitu-
tive documents. The latter approach has the merit of legislative
approval for other Montana mutual benefit corporations.'79
D. Are Leasehold Condominiums Permitted?
As noted earlier,"s one of the functions of the condomini-
um declaration is to shatter an estate in land into fragments: the
units and appurtenant shares of the common elements. The
estate in land so divided usually is a fee simple, but in most
states it may be a leasehold as well. To create a leasehold condo-
minium the fee owner of land conveys a long-term ground lease
(perhaps ninety-nine years) to the developer. The developer then
files a condominium declaration subdividing the leasehold into
units. Conveyance of units is by assigning fractions of the ground
lease.
Although several purported leasehold condominiums exist in
Montana, 181 statutory language might lead one to conclude that
they are not permitted. In this subpart, I shall examine that
language. I conclude that, although the statute contains a con-
177. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-308(2) (1995).
178. See UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-106, 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 301 (1997).
179. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-2-230(1) & (2) (1995).
180. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
181. In a survey of Gallatin County Recordings, the author found four identified
leasehold condominiums among a total of 188 active condominiums. The four were:
Aircraft Condominium, supra note 127; Auto Park Condominium, Phase 1, supra note
127; Gallatin Field Car Keep Condominium, microformed on Doc. No. 146928, Book
89 of Misc., p. 4770, Nov. 4, 1985 (Gallatin County, Montana, Clerk and Recorder's
Office); and Twenty-Seven East Main Condominium, microforrned on Doc. No. 102943,
Book 72 of Misc., p. 1374, Oct. 21, 1982 (Gallatin County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office).
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tradiction on this point, the contradiction should be resolved in
favor of permitting leasehold condominiums.
This problem arose, as so many problems arose, from incau-
tious use of the Puerto Rican condominium statute as a model.
Because the Anglo-American system of "estates in land" is a
creature of common law, the Puerto Rican statute, developed in a
civil law environment, contained no provision for leasehold con-
dominiums."8 2
The drafters of the FHA Model Statute did not correct this
deficiency. Instead, they provided that all units ("apartments")
were to be held in fee simple. Thus, the FHA defined "apartment
owner" as: "the person or persons owning an apartment in fee
simple absolute and an undivided interest in the fee simple es-
tate of the common areas and facilities in the percentage speci-
fied and established in the Declaration."" The Montana defini-
tion of "unit owner" similarly contemplates only fee simple own-
ership: "Unit owner' means the person owning a unit in fee
simple absolute individually or as co-owner in any real estate
tenancy relationship recognized under the laws of this
state . . . ."'" The same section next provides for leases of
units, by allowing the unit owner to delegate voting rights to the
tenant if the lease is filed with the association chairman. But the
context is such as to imply leases of already existing units-not
of the initial creation of ground lease units."
In opposition to that section is section 70-23-301, which lists
the contents of the declaration." Section 70-23-301 makes ex-
plicit provision for leasehold condominiums by requiring that the
declaration contain "a description of the land, whether leased or
in fee simple, on which the building is or is to be located....
"187 Moreover, the italicized language represents an addition to
the FHA Model Statute's original form,1" apparently to accom-
182. See Ley Para establecer el Rlgimen de la Propiedad Horizontal [Law to es-
tablish the Horizontal Property Regime], art. 4, 1958 P.R. Laws 104.
183. FHA MODEL STATUTE, § 2(b) (1965). See also idU § 2(m) (defining property
as the entire development "owned in fee simple absolute").
184. MONTANA CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(17) (1995) ("Tenancy" as used here of
course refers to co-tenancy, not leases.).
185. The language reads: "However, for all purposes, including the exercise of
voting rights, provided by lease filed with the presiding officer of the association of
unit owners, a lessee of a unit shall be considered a unit owner." MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 70-23-102(17) (1995). MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-308(3) (1995) makes it clear that
the legal title of the "presiding officer" is "chairman."
186. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-301(1) (1995).
187. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-301(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
188. See FHA MODEL STATUTE § 11(1) (1965): "The declaration shall contain the
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modate leasehold condominiums. Several other sections of the
UOA also contemplate leasehold condominiums. 8 '
Short of statutory amendment, there is no way to eliminate
entirely the contradiction between section 70-23-301, which ex-
plicitly contemplates leasehold condominiums, and section 70-23-
102(17), which limits the definition of "unit owner" to one who
holds in fee simple. Pending such amendment, however, the
section in which the drafters clearly departed from their FHA
model-i.e., section 70-23-301-should control. In that section,
the drafters did provide for leasehold condominiums.
Unfortunately, for a lessee to be treated as a "unit owner"
under section 70-23-102(17) of the Montana Code, his lease must
be "filed with the presiding officer of the association of unit own-
ers." 9 ' Under the rule of that section, the lessee is not treated
as a unit owner before filing. But in a leasehold condominium,
the only unit owners are lessees. If no lessees can be considered
unit owners before their ground lease is filed, then there are no
unit owners before that ground lease is filed. Ergo, before the
ground lease is filed there can be no "association of unit owners,"
and ergo there can be no association presiding officer with whom
to file it. Hence a dilemma: There can be no unit owners without
filing, and no filing without unit owners.
The Montana Supreme Court considered an analogous prob-
lem in Jordan v. Elizabethan Manor,9' where the plaintiff ar-
gued that certain condominium bylaws were invalid.'92 The
plaintiff pointed out that the project developers had promulgated
these bylaws only after issuing deeds to various units. 93 Under
the circumstances, the plaintiff contended that the bylaws were
following particulars: (1) Description of the land on which the building and improve-
ments are or are to be located.-
189. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-205(lXaXi) (1995) (reference to "ground
lease" payments as a possible cost of development); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-602
(1995) (need to satisfy liens "[a]t the time of the first conveyance or lease of each
unit following the recording of the declaration .... "); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-
201(1) (1995) (units conveyed or leased prior to the completion of construction of the
building within which such unit is located).
190. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(17) (1995):
"Unit owner" means the person owning a unit in fee simple absolute indi-
vidually or as co-owner in any real estate tenancy relationship recognized
under the laws of this state. However, for all purposes, including the exer-
cise of voting rights, provided by lease filed with the presiding officer of the
association of unit owners, a lessee of a unit shall be considered a unit
owner.
191. 181 Mont. 424, 593 P.2d 1049 (1979).
192. See Jordan, 181 Mont. at 429, 593 P.2d at 1052.
193. See id. at 429-30, 593 P.2d at 1052-53.
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not adopted by the "unit owners," as required by section 70-23-
307(1) of the Montana Code.19' In response, the court observed
that when the bylaws were promulgated the developers had still
not filed the declaration.19 Without a declaration, there could
be no conveyance of units; thus, despite the purported convey-
ances, the developers retained fee simple title.96 "Until the fi-
nal declaration is filed," the court concluded, "the fee owners of
the project are the fee owners of the units and thus the 'unit
owners.
' 97
This is a useful fiction: 98 The pre-declaration fee owners
can be seen as constructive, not real unit owners. According
them that status offers a solution to the problem of how the
owners of leasehold units can be treated as "unit owners" under
section 70-23-102(17). Specifically, the fee owner of the land (con-
structive unit owner) should create the association, designate a
presiding officer, and then file the ground lease with that officer.
Anyone who takes a unit of that ground lease will then be a
"unit owner" under the statute. By now it should be clear that
amendment of section 70-23-102(17) of the Montana Code is
needed to clarify that leasehold condominiums are valid beyond
peradventure.
E. Association Collection of Common Expenses
1. Assessment Collection: An Overview
Under the UOA, expenses of maintaining the common por-
tion of a condominium are called "common expenses." The UOA
identifies the following categories of common expenses:
• expenses of administration, maintenance, repair, or re-
placement of the common elements;' 99
• unpaid unit assessments rendered unrecoverable by
reason of foreclosure of a first mortgage;"
194. See id.; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-307(1) (1995): "The unit owners
of each property shall adopt bylaws to govern the administration of the property."
195. See Jordan, 181 Mont. at 431, 593 P.2d at 1053.
196. See id. at 430-31, 593 P.2d at 1053.
197. Id. at 431, 593 P.2d at 1053.
198. The court acknowledged that filing a declaration was necessary to the es-
tablishment of a condominium, but did not explain how, without a condominium,
there could be either condominium "units" or "unit owners." See id. at 430, 593 P.2d
at 1053.
199. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(4Xa) (1995).
200. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-102(4Xc), 70-23-610 (1995).
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" insurance premiums on the common elements;01
" expenses declared common by the declaration or the
bylaws of the particular condominium;2 2 and
" expenses agreed upon as common by all the unit own-
ers.
203
Proper collection, management, and disbursal of common ex-
pense money-like responsible management generally-is an
official duty of association directors and officers.2'"
The UOA and existing common law (especially case law from
other states) offer broad, and generally adequate, rules for man-
agement and disbursement of common expense funds. However,
the UOA needs to be amended with respect to collection of such
funds.
Most POAs, including condominium associations, raise all or
nearly all of the money necessary for common expenses by im-
posing periodic assessments on each unit. Such assessments may
be annual or monthly in form, but as a rule payment is due
monthly.
The most common legal bases for collection are (1) a person-
al debt of the unit owner created by contract, (2) a personal debt
201. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-102(4Xc), 70-23-612 (1995).
202. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(4Xc) (1995); see also MONT. CODE ANN. §
70-23-301(8) (1995) (optional contents in declaration; however, no comparable provi-
sion exists for the bylaws).
203. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(4)(b) (1995).
204. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 477-84; see also Thisted v. Tower
Management Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 409 P.2d 813 (1966). The attempt of the drafters of
one set of bylaws to devolve primary responsibility for common expenses to individu-
al unit owners probably violates the UOA, which directs that such assessments shall
be imposed according to the percentage of undivided interest in the common ele-
ments. See Bylaws of Maplewood Court Condominiums, microformed on Doc. No.
380514, Book 208 of Deeds, p. 159, Apr. 12, 1994 (Ravalli County, Montana, Clerk
and Recorder's Office) (maintenance of common areas, apparently exclusively limited
common elements, is the responsibility of individual owners, with POA to assess only
in event maintenance is not adequate). Cf MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-501, 70-23-
102(4)
(1995).
Management also includes the keeping of proper records, which are open to
inspection by unit owners, according to MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-606 (1995):
Records of receipts and expenditures affecting common elements-inspection.
(1) The manager shall keep detailed accurate records in chronological order
of the receipts and expenditures affecting the common elements, itemizing
the maintenance and repair expenses of the common elements and any
other expenses incurred.
(2) Such records and the vouchers authorizing the payments and receipts
for payments shall be available for examination at the manager's place of
business by the unit owners at convenient hours of weekdays.
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of the unit owner created by statute, (3) a lien created by con-
tract and enforceable against the unit in the event of nonpay-
ment, or (4) a lien created by statute and similarly enforceable
against the unit."' The first and third bases for enforcement
are made viable by the common law of servitudes. The contractu-
al personal debt is created by an affirmative covenant running
with the land at law, which in most states is found in the decla-
ration.2" In Montana, there is no rule against placing an as-
sessment covenant in the declaration, °7 but the expectation of
the statute is that it be placed in the bylaws only.2"s Often
drafters place it in both documents,2" sometimes only in the
declaration,210 and occasionally in a set of covenants filed with
the declaration and bylaws." The contractual lien is created
by a covenant running with the land in equity (equitable servi-
tude)-generally the same covenant that creates the personal
debt at law. The second and fourth bases for assessment collec-
tion-statutory debts and statutory liens-are imposed by state
condominium acts.2"
One might question why statutes providing for assessment
205. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 215-24, 231-35. Other, less commonly
used bases for enforcement of assessments include a reserved "rent" or charge
against the unit and restitution of unjust enrichment. See id. at 213-15, 224-31.
206. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.104(4Xg) (West 1997); UNIF. CONDOMINrUM
ACT § 2-107, 7 U.L.A_ 250 (1997).
207. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-§301(8) (1995).
208. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-308(6) (1995) (contents of bylaws to include
"the manner of collecting from the unit owners their share of the common expenses");
see, e.g., Declaration of Unit Ownership and Statement of Covenants and Bylaws of
Association of Unit Owners of 1993 Office Building Condominiums, supra note 127;
Declaration of Condominium Under Unit Ownership Act Pertaining to Clearview
Village, supra note 149; Bylaws of The Palace Condominium Ass'n, supra note 127;
Bylaws of Maplewood Court Condominium, supra note 204.
209. See, e.g., Declaration for the Willowbrook Condominium, supra note 168;
Enabling Declaration Establishing a Plan for Condominium Ownership for Regency
South Building Condominium, supra note 168; Bylaws of Regency South Building
Condominium, supra note 149.
210. See Declaration of Condominium for Panorama Park Condominiums, supra
note 149 (accompanying bylaws include only references to assessment covenant).
211. See, e.g., Amended Statement of Restrictive Covenants of 'The Narrows,"
microformed on Recep. No. 339937, July 9, 1992 (Lake County, Montana, Clerk and
Recorder's Office).
212. Statutory schemes applicable to common interest subdivisions other than
condominiums also provide for statutory liens. See, e.g., UNIF. COMMON INTEREST
OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116, 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 122 (1997) (creation of lien by statute ap-
plicable to most residential POAs). The original (1982) version of the UCIOA has
been adopted in Alaska, Colorado, Minnesota, Nevada, and West Virginia. This uni-
form law was amended in 1994; the Act and the 1994 amendments have been adopt-
ed in Connecticut.
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enforcement are necessary. For the most part, the common law
of servitudes is sufficient to enforce unit owners' obligations, 3
and the common law usually has proved adequate for similar
enforcement by noncondominium POAs.21
One reason for statutory supplementation is to reverse the
traditional common law rule, viable in some states, that cove-
nants at law do not survive foreclosure. Without statutory modi-
fication, this rule would destroy the association's ability to collect
assessments at law against the owner of any unit that had gone
through foreclosure.215 Another reason for statutory supplemen-
tation specifically applicable to Montana is to modify Field Code
statutes that commit Montana to jurisprudence borrowed from
nineteenth century New York State-jurisprudence often inap-
propriate for condominiums." 6
For example, suppose that after the developer sells all his
interest in a condominium, the unit owners duly adopt an
amendment to the declaration or bylaws that imposes additional
maintenance assessments on unit owners. Under the Field Code,
this amendment arguably is unenforceable at law because it
violates the "horizontal privity" requirement that it be contained
in a grant.217
A third reason for statutory supplementation is to clarify the
judicial foreclosure procedure applicable to the assessment lien.
Under the UOA, assessments are to be allocated among units
according to the percentage of undivided interest each unit has
in the common elements.218 The share of the common interest
213. For a discussion of the law of servitudes and the modern POA, see
NATEISON, POA, supra note 1, at 37-64. See also Thisted v. Country Club Tower
Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965).
214. The seminal case is Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant
Industrial Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1938).
215. O'Donnell v. McIntyre, 23 N.E. 455 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1890). In Neponsit, the
mortgage on the unit in question had been foreclosed. Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d at 793.
This may be why the POA apparently sought enforcement only of its lien (in equity),
not of the personal debt of the unit owner.
216. See supra Part IV(B).
217. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-203 (1995). For a discussion of horizontal
privity and its history in Montana, see Natelson, Running, supra note 1, at 24, 50-
51, 60-65. The state supreme court has evaded the horizontal privity requirement
from time to time, but only when the covenant at issue is restrictive. See id.
Note that if the covenant imposes an assessment change that is sufficiently
large or impacts some owners disproportionately, a court might rule that it is unrea-
sonable and therefore invalid as to existing unit owners. See Natelson, Consent, su-
pra note 1, at 68-71.
218. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-501 (1995): "Common profits and expenses.
The common profits of the property shall be distributed among and the common
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appurtenant to each unit is specified in the declaration,219 and
that share is to be proportional to each unit's "value."220 The
bylaws then determine "the manner of collecting from the unit
owners their share of the common expenses.... 221
Although the bylaws could conceivably add other methods,
the statute describes two collection tools for the association. The
first is an action at law to enforce the personal liability of the
unit owner, which liability cannot be avoided by failing to use
the common elements.22 Such an action may be commenced
without foreclosing the lien.m The second statutory assessment
collection tool is the statutory lien. To take advantage of this
mechanism, the association must record a verified "claim" for
unpaid assessments, which "claim" must describe the amount
due, the unit, the name of the owner, and the common ele-
ments. 22' The POA "manager" (meaning in this case, the board
expenses shall be charged to the unit owners according to the percentage of undivid-
ed interest of each in the common elements."
Thus, a unit with a two percent undivided interest in the common elements
pays two percent of the common expenses, a unit with a three percent interest pays
three percent, and so on.
219. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-301(4) (1995).
220. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
221. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-308(6) (1995).
222. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-505 (1995): "Abandonment or waiver of use
not to effect exemption. No unit owner may exempt himself from liability for his
contribution towards the common expenses by waiver of the use or enjoyment of any
of the common elements or by abandonment of his unit."
On liability, see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-611 (1995) (joint liability of
unit grantor and grantee).
223. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-608(2) (1995): "An action to recover a money
judgment for unpaid common expenses may be maintained without foreclosing or
waiving the lien securing the claim for common expenses."
224. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-607 (1995):
Claim for common expenses-priority of lien--contents--recording.
(1) Whenever an association of unit owners acting through its manager
furnishes to a unit any services, labor, or material lawfully chargeable as
common expenses, the association of unit owners, upon complying with
subsection (2) of this section, shall have a lien upon the individual unit and
the undivided interest in the common elements appertaining to such unit
for the reasonable value of such common expenses, and the lien shall be
prior to all other liens or encumbrances upon the unit except:
(a) tax and assessment liens; and
(b) a first mortgage or trust indenture of record.
(2) An association of unit owners claiming the benefits of subsection (1) of
this section shall record in the county in which the unit or some part
thereof is located a claim containing:
(a) a true statement of the account due for such common expenses after
deducting all just credits and offsets;
(b) the name of the owner of the unit or reputed owner, if known;
(c) a description of the property where the common expenses were furnished
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of directors)21 may then foreclose the lien in accordance with
the rules for foreclosing construction liens,226 which in turn
largely rely on the Montana civil procedure statutes.27 Addi-
tional provisions clarify that the association may bid and pur-
chase at the foreclosure sale,2' and that foreclosure purchasers
are liable only for assessments coming due after they acquire
title."9
These statutory collection tools are similar to procedures
prevailing elsewhere, and do not contain any obvious deficien-
cies.
2. Assessment Collection: Reforming the Lien Priority Statute
More problematic are two other rules governing Montana
condominium assessment liens-one that treats the association
too shabbily, and another that treats the association too well.
Under the UOA, a proportionate share of the common ele-
ments is appurtenant to each unit and inseparable from it. A
lender who extends credit with a condominium unit as securi-
and the designation of the unit, sufficient for identification.
(3) The claim shall be verified by the oath of some person having
knowledge of the facts and shall be fied with and recorded by the record-
ing officer in the book kept for the purpose of recording liens filed under
Title 71, chapter 3, part 5. The record shall be indexed as deeds and other
conveyances are required by law to be indexed.
225. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
226. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-608 (1995):
Foreclosure of lien under claim for common expenses-action without fore-
closure.
(1) The proceedings to foreclose liens created by 70-23-607 shall conform as
nearly as possible to the proceedings to foreclose liens created by Title 71,
chapter 3, part 5. The lien may be enforced by the manager acting on be-
half of the association of unit owners.
227. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-563 (1995) (referencing rules of practice of
MONT. CODE ANN., tit. 25).
228. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-§609(2) (1995): "The manager acting on be-
half of the unit owners shall have power, unless prohibited by the declaration, to bid
on the unit at the foreclosure sale and to acquire and hold, lease, mortgage, and
convey the same."
229. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-610 (1995):
Purchaser at foreclosure sale not totally liable for prior common expenses.
Where the purchaser of a unit obtains title to the unit as a result of fore-
closure of the first mortgage or trust indenture, such purchaser, his succes-
sors, and assigns shall not be liable for any of the common expenses
chargeable to such unit which became due prior to the acquisition of title to
such unit by such purchaser. Such unpaid share of common expenses shall
be a common expense of all the unit owners, including such purchaser, his
successors, and assigns.
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ty-who takes a mortgage on the property after the recording of
the declaration-takes as collateral not only the unit itself, but
the appurtenant share of the common elements. The association
utilizes assessments imposed on units to repair, maintain and
improve the common elements, and therefore to preserve and im-
prove the lender's security. Just as a lender foreclosing on a
single family home might use its own funds to maintain that
home until sale, so one would think a lender would expect to pay
the assessments that preserve and improve its security.
Yet the UOA, like virtually every other first generation con-
dominium statute, grants priority over the assessment lien to
any "first mortgage or trust indenture of record," even if the
mortgage or trust indenture was entered into and recorded after
the filing of the declaration and after the filing of the
association's lien claim.23
It is not hard to find the reasons for this anomaly. In part, it
is a carry-over from the Puerto Rican law that served as a model
for the FHA Model Statute, and therefore indirectly, for the
UOA.2 ' The FHA Model Statute gave priority to first mortgag-
ees in language similar to that of the UOA."2 It also is a re-
flection of the lobbying power of lenders,' magnified through
the FHA, which insures first mortgages, and has an interest in
affording such mortgages a high priority.
Professor James Winokur has summarized well the compel-
ling case for giving the assessment lien priority over subsequent
mortgages.23 As noted above, condominium assessments are
used to bolster the lender's security; to permit the lender's mort-
gage to cut off those assessments is to bestow unjust enrichment
of a kind not existing in other foreclosure settings, where the
lender expects to spend money to protect his collateral. The cost
of this enrichment is borne by the other unit owners, who are
innocent of any wrongdoing.2"
230. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-607(1) (1995): "[T]he lien shall be prior to all
other liens or encumbrances upon the unit except: (a) tax and assessment liens; and
(b) a first mortgage or trust indenture of record."
231. See Art. 40(c), 1958 P.R. Laws 104.
232. See FHA MODEL STATUTE, § 23(a) (1965).
233. Lending interests have usually, although not invariably, opposed granting
the association lien priority over first mortgages. See Winokur, Meaner, supra note 1,
at 389-90.
234. The arguments are derived from Winokur, Meaner, supra note 1, at 358-62.
See also, NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 238-41.
235. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-610 (1995): "Such unpaid share of common
expenses shall be a common expense of all the unit owners, including such purchas-
er, his successors, and assigns."
1997] 543
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Moreover, under the current priority rules, mortgage foreclo-
sures may leave associations with no equity remaining from
which to collect their arrears. Over time, this can damage the
association and the security of other lenders. Professor Winokur
points out that it also can impede the delivery of public services,
which POAs are increasingly assuming from local governments.
Indeed, the position of the POA as a service provider argues for
the condominium lien having superpriority comparable to a tax
lien.
Additionally, lenders are in a far better position to protect
themselves against default than is the POA. Unlike most POAs,
lenders can choose with whom they will do business. The lender
can obtain mortgage insurance. Lenders can insist on escrow
arrangements for association assessments, just as they do now
for taxes and insurance.
The UOA's policy of absolving lenders and foreclosure sale
purchasers2" from prior assessment responsibility is dramati-
cally different from the policy the UOA applies to consensual
transfers. Under the UOA, a consensual grantee becomes "jointly
and severally liable with the grantor for all unpaid charges
against the latter for his proportionate share of the common
expenses up to the time of the grant or conveyance, without
prejudice to the grantee's right to recover from the grantor the
amounts paid by the grantee therefor."" 7
Section 3-116 of the UCA offers a modest compromise in this
area.2" It grants assessment priority over first mortgages when
236. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-610 (1995). See supra note 229 for text of
statute.
237. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-611 (1995).
238. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-116, 7 pt. 2 U.LA_ 320 (1997) reads in part:
Lien for Assessments.
(a) The association has a lien on a unit for any assessment levied against
that unit or fines imposed against its unit owner from the time the assess-
ment or fine becomes due . .. . If an assessment is payable in instalments
[sic], the full amount of the assessment is a lien from the time the first in-
stalment thereof becomes due.
(b) A lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encumbrances on
a unit except (i) liens and encumbrances recorded before the recordation of
the declaration, (ii) a first mortgage or deed of trust on the unit recorded
before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became
delinquent, and (iii) liens for real estate taxes and other governmental as-
sessments or charges against the unit. The lien is also prior to the
mortgages and deeds of trust described in clause (ii) above to the extent of
the common expense assessments based on the periodic budget adopted by
the association pursuant to Section 3-115(a) which would have become due
in the absence of acceleration during the 6 months immediately preceding
[Vol. 58544
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the assessments accrue no more than six months before com-
mencement of the foreclosure action, so long as the assessments
are "based on the periodic budget adopted by the associa-
tion."239 Section 3-116 also states that recording of the declara-
tion is notice of any association assessment claim-there is no
need, as in Montana, to record an additional document. At any
time a lender or prospective lender can ensure the precise
amount of any arrears by inducing the unit owner to obtain from
the association a recordable statement setting forth the amount
thereof. This statement is binding on the association.'
The merits and problems in the UCA approach have been
explored fully elsewhere,241 and I shall not repeat them at
length. Suffice to say, the merits far outweigh the problems.242
By limiting the priority to six months of periodic assessments
levied pursuant to a budget, the approach encourages the asso-
ciation to enforce the assessment lien diligently and to budget
periodically. The lender is not disadvantaged by sudden special
assessments or by huge, unsuspected arrears. Lenders are al-
most invariably sophisticated enough to be on actual notice of
recorded condominium declarations, so dispensing with lien
claims reduces needless paperwork and recording. Use of estop-
pel certificates to ascertain the amount of any arrearages is
already well established practice, and is authorized by the
UOA.' The Montana legislature should amend the UOA to
institution of an action to enforce the lien. This subsection does not affect
the priority of mechanics' or materialmen's liens, or the priority of liens for
other assessments made by the association....
(d) Recording of the declaration constitutes record notice and perfection of
the lien. No further recordation of any claim of lien for assessment under
this section is required.
(h) The association upon written request shall furnish to a unit owner a
recordable statement setting forth the amount of unpaid assessments
against his unit. The statement must be furnished within (10) business
days after receipt of the request and is binding on the association, the
executive board, and every unit owner.
Id. (emphasis added).
239. UNiF. CoNDOMINIUM AcT § 3-116(h), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 321 (1997).
240. See id.
241. See, e.g., Winokur, Meaner, supra note 1.
242. For example, one problem identified by Professor Winokur is that the Act
requires a POA seeking priority to begin an action for judicial foreclosure even in
states which permit foreclosure by sale. See id. This is not an issue in Montana,
where lien foreclosure can be performed only judicially. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-
23-608 (1995).
243. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-611 (1995):
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grant to condominium association liens a priority at least compa-
rable to that offered by the UCA.
3. Assessment Collection: Substituting Assessments for Rent
Just as the lien priority statute treats the condominium
association too shabbily, the rule governing foreclosure treats the
association too well. This is the provision permitting the bylaws
to specify that the POA may collect rent from the debtor-unit
owner between default and eviction.'"
This provision is radically different from the rules governing
a closely allied area: mortgage foreclosure. Under Montana mort-
gage law, a debtor who personally resides on foreclosed property
is entitled to possession during the entire statutory redemption
period for one year after the sale.2" Because possession is a
matter of right for the debtor, it follows that the mortgagee is
entitled neither to collection of rent during that period nor, un-
less the security is threatened, to the appointment of a receiv-
er.' The policy protecting homeowner possession is so strong
that the right to debtor possession may not be altered by a previ-
ous agreement between creditor and debtor.247
When, however, foreclosure stems from failure to pay condo-
minium assessments, the bylaws may authorize the association
to collect rent from the unit owner, presumably from the time of
default. The association also is entitled to appointment of a re-
ceiver to collect that rent.'" This is not only inconsistent with
pro-homeowner policy in the mortgage realm, it also overcompen-
sates the association at the expense of the debtor and at the
expense of junior lienors.
The better way to protect the association's interest is to
amend the UOA to give the POA assessment lien priority over
[U]pon request of a prospective purchaser, the manager shall make and
deliver a statement of the unpaid charges against the prospective grantor,
and the grantee in that case is not liable for nor is the unit when conveyed
subject to a lien filed thereafter for any unpaid charges against the grantor
in excess of the amount therein set forth.
The Uniform Act mandates that the unit owner request the statement, not the
prospective purchaser. The Uniform Act approach ensures that the association need
respond only to its own members rather than to anyone who deems himself a "pro-
spective purchaser."
244. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-609(1) (1995).
245. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-229, 25-13-802 (1995).
246. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-102(2) (1995).
247. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-229 (1995).
248. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-609(1) (1995).
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subsequently recorded first mortgages, as suggested above. Dur-
ing the period between default and eviction, the debtor should
continue to be liable for condominium assessments, but not for
rent.
F. Someone to Lien on: Other Third Party Priorities
A recurring question in condominium jurisprudence is the
extent to which a lien encumbering part of the development
affects other parts of the development. The lien in question is
usually a construction or mechanics lien. Such a lien may arise
(1) because of work requested by an individual unit owner or by
the association acting as the owner's agent in an emergency, (2)
because of work on the common elements ordered by the associa-
tion or by the developer after filing of the declaration, or (3)
because of work done in original construction before the declara-
tion was filed. The UOA includes several provisions designed to
deal with these issues. However, the UOA scheme is imperfect in
several respects.
Sections 70-23-603 and 604 of the Montana Code are target-
ed at work on a particular unit ordered by a unit owner or by the
association acting as the owner's agent in an emergency. Section
70-23-603 provides that after recording of the declaration-and
the resulting division of the development into units--"no lien
shall arise or be effective against the property."' Instead,
liens "shall arise or be created only against each unit" and its
appurtenant common elements.' The phrasing of the section
is odd, because under the UOA the "property" includes the units,
so liens cannot arise against units without arising against some
portion of the "property."21  Apparently, section 70-23-603
means that liens are not to be enforced against the property as a
249. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-603 (1995):
Lien allowable against unit not against the property. Subsequent to record-
ing a declaration and while the property remains subject to this chapter, no
lien shall arise or be effective against the property. During such period
liens or encumbrances shall arise or be created only against each unit and
the undivided interest in the common elements appertaining thereto, in the
same manner and under the same conditions as liens or encumbrances may
arise or be created upon or against any other separate parcel of real prop-
erty subject to individual ownership.
250. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-603 (1995).
251. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-102(13) (1995): "Property' means the land,
all buildings, improvements, and structures thereon and all easements, rights, and
appurtenances belonging thereto which are submitted to the provisions of this
chapter."
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single parcel. In other words, a unit owner ordering work can
encumber his own unit only, not that of his neighbors. Thus,
under section 70-23-604, his nonconsenting neighbors are free of
any resulting lien. The same section states that the same rule
applies when the work is constructively ordered by the unit own-
er, i.e., when the association orders repairs on a unit in an emer-
gency.
252
Another provision of the UOA, section 70-23-605, targets
cases where the lien arises from work on the common elements
ordered by the association or developer after the property has
been divided into units. Any such lien is treated as divisible: in
effect, there are as many liens as there are units encumbered.
Accordingly, any unit owner can clear or disencumber his unit by
paying his proportionate share of the total debt.'
Section 70-23-602 of the Montana Code is designed to deal
with liens incurred by the condominium developer, whether
incurred before or after the declaration is recorded. This section
states:
LIENS TO BE SATISFIED OR RELEASED AT TIME OF FIRST CONVEY-
ANCE. At the time of the first conveyance or lease of each unit
following the recording of the declaration, every mortgage and
other lien affecting such unit, including the undivided interest
of the unit in the common elements, shall be paid and satisfied
of record or the unit being conveyed or leased and its interest
in the common elements shall be released therefrom by partial
252. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-604 (1995):
Construction or materialman's lien-no effect on nonconsenting own-
er-exception. No labor performed or materials furnished with the con-
sent or at the request of a unit owner, his agent, contractor, or subcontrac-
tor shall be the basis for the filing of a construction or materialman's lien
against the unit of any other unit owner not consenting to or requesting
the labor to be performed or the materials to be furnished, except that
consent shall be considered given by the owner of any unit in the case of
emergency repairs thereto performed or furnished with the consent or at
the request of the manager.
253. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-605 (1995):
Lien effective against two or more units-release from. If a lien becomes
effective against two or more units, the owner of each unit subject to such
a lien shall have the right to have his unit released from the lien by pay-
ment of the amount of the lien attributable to his unit. The amount of the
lien attributable to a unit and the payment required to satisfy such a lien,
in the absence of agreement, shall be determined by application of the per-
centage established in the declaration. Such partial payment, satisfaction, or
discharge shall not prevent the lienor from proceeding to enforce his rights
against any unit and the undivided interest in the common element apper-
taining thereto not so released by payment, satisfaction, or discharge.
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release duly recorded.2"
In other words, its solution to the problem of developer liens is to
require that the developer clear them from each unit before he
conveys that unit.
But what happens if the developer does not clear a unit
prior to conveyance? As noted above, if the lien attached after
filing of the declaration, then the unit owner can free his unit by
paying off only his share of the debt. But what if the lien was
filed before the declaration? Is each unit encumbered to the full
extent of the debt? This was the problem the Montana Supreme
Court faced in Hostetter v. Inland Development Corp."
Hostetter arose out of the development of the Glacier Condo-
minium at Big Sky. A subcontractor, Dutch Touch, agreed to
construct ceramic bathroom enclosures in each individual unit,
and shortly thereafter commenced work.' Under the rule ex-
isting then (and now), Dutch Touch's construction lien attached
at the commencement of work.257 Four months later the decla-
ration was filed, thereby dividing the property into individual
units.' Over the ensuing three months the developer sold
eighteen of sixty-four units, but did not clear those units from
the subcontractor's lien. 9 When Dutch Touch did not receive
full payment, it recorded its lien statement and sought to fore-
close against all units, including those previously sold.2"
Although Dutch Touch's entire argument is not set forth in
the opinion, that argument should run as follows: The
subcontractor's contract was indivisible. A single lien secures a
single debt-that was the bargain. Dutch Touch was not a party
to the subsequent filing of the declaration, so that filing could
not prejudice Dutch Touch's rights. But unit purchasers are on
notice of possible unrecorded construction liens; those purchasers
should not have accepted title to their units without the appro-
priate releases. That they did is unfortunate. They may have a
cause of action against the developer or its prime contractor-but
that is not the concern of Dutch Touch, which is entitled to be
paid by the parties who benefitted from the subcontractor's work.
The court essentially acknowledged that this would be the case
254. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-602 (1995).
255. 172 Mont. 167, 561 P.2d 1323 (1977).
256. See Hostetter, 172 Mont. at 169, 561 P.2d at 1324.
257. See id. at 172-73, 561 P.2d at 1326-27.
258. See id. at 169, 561 P.2d at 1324-25.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 169, 561 P.2d at 1325.
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in absence of the UOA.261
To continue Dutch Touch's argument: section 70-23-603 of
the Montana Code does not change this situation. That section is
targeted at liens arising only after recording of the declaration.
Applying the section to pre-existing liens could have the effect of
invalidating them entirely ("no lien shall... be effective against
the property"). In view of the legislative policy of protecting those
who supply labor and material to a construction site, one cannot
assume-as the trial court did-that the legislature wished to
allow a developer to unilaterally and completely invalidate pre-
existing construction liens by filing a declaration. Therefore, the
section should be construed as tailored only to liens arising after
recording of the declaration.
The Montana Supreme Court held that section 70-23-603 did
change the pre-existing law-not by invalidating the lien entire-
ly, as the trial court concluded, but by shattering the lien into
shares proportionate to each unit.262 In effect, the court held
that "property" in the statute2 means "property as a whole."
This would require Dutch Touch to foreclose against each unit.
If the court had gone no farther, such a conclusion would
have left unit purchasers vulnerable to Dutch Touch's claim.
However, this would have been contrary to a tacit judicial policy
of protecting those who, while on constructive notice, have no
actual notice of a potential claim.26' Accordingly, the court held
that "[e]quity demands" that Dutch Touch proceed first against
units retained by the developer.2" Only if those units prove in-
sufficient to pay the debt, should the subcontractor be permitted
to levy on units owned by purchasers.2" In effect, the court ap-
plied a marshalling doctrine closely analogous to the "inverse
order of alienation" rule.267
261. See id.
262. See id. at 174, 561 P.2d at 1327.
263. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
264. The court stated that the purchasers were "charged with constructive, if not
actual, notice" of the lien. Hostetter, 172 Mont. at 175, 561 P.2d at 1328. For exam-
ples of the tacit policy of protecting those without actual notice, even if on construc-
tive notice, see Natelson, Running, supra note 1, at 72-75.
265. See Hostetter, 172 Mont. at 176, 561 P.2d at 1328.
266. See id.
267. This rule holds that if 0, owning Blackacre subject to a lien, conveys par-
cels to successive purchasers with a promise to hold them harmless from the lien,
then on foreclosure the lienor must proceed first against any parcels retained by 0,
and only then against purchasers in inverse order of alienation-that is, latest con-
veyance first. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW 741 (3d ed. 1993).
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The result of Hostetter seems just, but the contortions neces-
sary to reach it strongly suggest the need to clarify the statute.
An amendment should ensure that the term "property" in section
70-23-603 of the Montana Code means only "property as a
whole." The legislature also should address more clearly the fate
of blanket construction liens when the property to which they
attach subsequently becomes subject to the condominium law.
G. Association Suits on Behalf of Unit Owners
Prominent in the nation's courts over the past few years
have been lawsuits by condominium purchasers against condo-
minium developers.ss The most common claims arise from al-
leged construction defects, mismanagement of the condominium
during the developer's period of control, and developer misrepre-
sentation to the association or to unit purchasers.2'9 Less com-
mon claims stem from alleged anti-trust violations, securities
law violations, and other statutory offenses.
When claims arise from alleged breaches of duty to the asso-
ciation or from defects in the common elements, the association
often seeks to act as a party plaintiff. The courts generally per-
mit this as to breaches of duty to the association, but several
courts have held that, in absence of a statute to the contrary, the
association cannot maintain common element lawsuits because it
does not own the common elements-it merely administers them.
These courts require that common element suits be maintained
by the unit owners as class actions.7v
Class actions are administratively clumsy and, it would
268. A detailed discussion of this subject appears in NATELSON, POA, supra note
1, at 308-20, 337-410.
269. For a Montana case of alleged misrepresentation, see Association of Unit
Owners of Deer Lodge Condominium, Inc. v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., 242 Mont.
358, 790 P.2d 967 (1990).
270. NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 309-20 identifies several different kinds of
developer-litigation cases for standing purposes:
Al: Debt or breach of duty to the POA;
A2: Loss to or defects in POA-owned property;
A3: Loss to or defects in property maintained, but not owned, by the POA;
BI: Cases involving both loss for which the POA can assess and unique loss
to individuals;
B2: Cases involving only unique loss to individuals.
See id. The author argues that the association should have standing in any of the
"Class A" cases but not in B2 cases. The answer to the question of who are proper
plaintiffs in "BI" cases depends on the individual facts.
The major area of uncertainty noted in the text is in A3 cases, where some
courts refuse to grant standing to the POA.
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seem, needlessly so when there is an existing entity (the POA)
whose very purpose is to represent the owners' common inter-
ests. Accordingly, there is a trend toward allowing associations
to maintain common element suits without requiring class certif-
ication.27" '
At first glance, the applicable Montana statute would seem
to have settled the matter. Section 70-23-901(1) of the Montana
Code states that the "manager" of the condominium (meaning
usually the board of directors)272 may bring an action "with re-
spect to any cause of action relating to the common elements or
more than one unit." The Utah Supreme Court has relied on a
similar statute in holding that the POA has the power to bring
common element lawsuits.273
But in State ex rel. Boyne USA, Inc. v. District Court,274 the
Montana Supreme Court refused to allow the association to rep-
resent the owners and held that a class action was neces-
sary.275 The court distinguished the Utah precedent by stating
that in the case before it, unlike the precedent, there was sub-
stantial unit owner dissent from the association's decision to
bring suit.276 A number of unit owners had not turned in "post-
card consents" for the POA to represent them.277 Others had
stated on their consents that they reserved the right to take
further action on their own.27 One of the developers, Boyne
USA, Inc., was both a defendant and the owner of twenty-seven
percent of the condominium units.279 The court held that the
proper vehicle for suit was a class action, so that Boyne and
other dissenters could withdraw from the class.2 0
The holding in Boyne is contrary to the plain meaning of the
statute, contrary to precedent, and contrary to reason. It is con-
trary to the plain meaning of the statute because that statute
271. See, e.g., UNIF. CoNDOMINIuM ACT § 3-102(4), 7 pt. 2 U.LA 288 (1997). A
collection of such statutes as of 1987 appears in Robert G. Natelson, Mending the
Social Compact: Expectancy Damages for Common Property Defects in Condominiums
and Other Planned Communities, 66 OREGON L. REV. 109, 117-18 n.36 (1987). For a
collection of cases so holding, see NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 316 n.22.
272. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
273. See Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535 (Utah
1983).
274. 228 Mont. 314, 742 P.2d 464 (1987).
275. See Boyne, 228 Mont. at 320, 742 P.2d at 468.
276. See id. at 318, 742 P.2d at 466-67.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 315-16, 742 P.2d at 464-65.
280. See id. at 320, 742 P.2d at 468.
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specifically says that the association may sue "with respect to
any cause of action relating to the common elements or more
than one unit."281 There is nothing in the statute that limits
the POA's power to bring causes of action where no significant
minority objects. The holding in Boyne is contrary to precedent
in that every other court that has considered the matter has
sustained the association's power to sue over the objections of
some owners. Moreover, it has been held repeatedly that devel-
opers who are simultaneously defendants and unit owners must
pay any assessments duly imposed on them, even if the proceeds
are to be used for litigation against them. 2
Boyne is contrary to reason in that it cripples associations
from suing whenever a substantial minority objects, especially if
the minority includes a defendant. In Boyne, the court noted that
a defendant developer still retained twenty-seven percent of the
units. Yet, it is a characteristic of such suits that they often
involve subdivisions where the developer retains a substantial
interest. Partly, this is because such suits often involve claims of
mismanagement while the developer was in control of the POA,
and suit cannot properly be delayed until the developer has
wholly sold out. Partly, it is because the same sort of problems
that give rise to the claims can be the same sort of problems that
have retarded the developer's sales-shoddy construction, for
example.
Another point must be considered. If Boyne's reasoning were
sound when the association is a plaintiff, then it would also be
sound when the association is a defendant. If a person or group
holding a substantial number of units were to sue the POA in
tort,' for example, consistency with Boyne would require that
the association not respond, and instead leave the defense to a
class consisting of those who wished to defend. Such a result
would further undermine both the UOA's statutory scheme'
281. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-901(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
282. See, e.g., Owens v. Tiber Island Condominium Ass'n, 373 A.2d 890 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1977) (POA could bring suit although minority objected; minority compelled to
help finance suit); Brickell Biscayne Corp. v. Palace Condominium Ass'n, 526 So.2d
982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that defendant developer must pay assess-
ments to finance litigation against it, and citing three additional Florida cases as
precedents).
283. POAs can be liable in tort to members and their guests. See, e.g., Simchuk
v. Angel Island Community Ass'n, 253 Mont. 221, 833 P.2d 158 (1992). For a general
treatment, see NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 320-25.
284. The association is subject to suit under MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-901(2), -
902 (1995).
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and the fundamental purpose of the association as a central
agent for common decision-making.'
Even without Boyne, unit owners who object to POA law-
suits already have considerable protection. The decision to sue,
like other POA decisions, is subject to judicial review on several
grounds, including compliance with proper procedures, sufficient
authority, and "reasonableness. "2 " Moreover, where claims are
unique to particular owners and the association has no obliga-
tion to repair the damage, a court can rule that class or individu-
al actions would be more appropriate than POA representa-
tion. 7
H. Terminating the Condominium
Any of several events may end, or set the stage for ending, a
condominium regime. A termination date may be set in the dec-
laration. The property may be taken by eminent domain. The
unit owners may opt for termination. The property may become
obsolete. The property may be destroyed. The UOA contains
provisions designed to deal with some, but not all, of these
events.2"
For many years, it was common for covenants governing
noncondominium homeowner associations to state that they
285. See the oft-cited language of Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman:
It appears to us that inherent in the condominium concept is the principle
that to promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of
the unit owners since they are living in such close proximity and using
facilities in common, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of
freedom of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately
owned property. Condominium unit owners comprise a little democratic sub
society of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of condominium
property than may be existent outside the condominium organization.
309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
286. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 411-84; Natelson, Consent, supra note
1. For Montana examples of procedural review, see Edgewater Townhouse
Homeowner's Ass'n v. Holtman, 256 Mont. 182, 845 P.2d 1224 (1993) and Thisted v.
Tower Management Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 409 P.2d 813 (1966). For a Montana case
involving both procedural and "reasonableness" review, see Trieweiler v. Spicher, 254
Mont. 321, 838 P.2d 382 (1992).
287. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 318-20. See also River Birch Assocs.
v. City of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. 1990) (association did not have standing to
pursue individuals' fraud and unfair trade practices claims); Vaughn v. Dame Constr.
Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 261 (Cal. 1990) (former owner had the right to pursue her unique
claim separately from the association).
288. In general, drafters of condominium statutes and documents have paid in-
sufficient attention to the termination issue. For a general discussion of the question,
see NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 617-631.
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would expire automatically at a certain time, such as twenty-five
years after initiation.289 However, the UOA contains no guid-
ance on how the parties should proceed upon expiration of any
similar period set forth in the condominium declaration. Fortu-
nately, such provisions are exceedingly rare in condominiums. In
leasehold condominiums, expiration of the term results in rever-
sion of the present possessory interest to the landlord, who then
makes all relevant decisions.
More serious is the lack of procedure to be followed if some
or all of the condominium is taken by eminent domain. Given the
current statute, the best one can do is to maintain that condem-
nation is "damage to or destruction of" the property, and there-
fore subject to section 70-23-803 of the Montana Code.2 °
However, the UOA does contain rules to deal with the other
three possibilities: unit owner decision to terminate, obsoles-
cence, and destruction. The relevant section on decision to termi-
nate states simply that a property can be removed from condo-
minium ownership by a recorded instrument if all unit owners
and lienholders agree, in which case liens on each unit become
liens on the owner's undivided interest.2 9' After removal, own-
ership becomes one big tenancy in common,292 and therefore
289. See NATELSON, POA, supra note 1, at 628.
290. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-803 (1995). Some declarations include con-
tractual provisions designed to deal with eminent domain. See, e.g., Declaration of
Unit Ownership for Yellowstone Townhomes, supra note 168 (POA to represent own-
ers in proceedings with condemning authority and to take possession of funds from
condemnation of common elements "to be held in trust for Unit Owners and their
first mortgage holders as their interests may appear." However, any restoration after
partial condemnation funds shall be "substantially in accordance with the Declaration
and the original plans and specifications .... "). Query: If under these clauses Unit
10, an end unit on a row of townhouses, holding a 1110 interest in the common
elements, is the only unit damaged by taking of common elements, is the award
divided pro-rata among all unit owners, or is it devoted exclusively to restoration of
the common elements around Unit 10? Or suppose the loss of common elements
injures several units, but disproportionately damages Unit 10? These clauses are
inadequate for such contingencies.
For another condemnation clause, see Bylaws of The Palace Condominium
Ass'n, supra note 127.
291. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-801 (1995):
Removal from chapter-recorded instrument-consent of lienholders. All of
the unit owners may remove a property from the provisions of this chapter
by executing and recording an instrument to that effect if the holders of all
liens affecting any of the units consent thereto or agree, in either case by
instruments duly recorded, that their liens be transferred to the undivided
interest of the unit owner in the property after removal from the provisions
of this chapter.
292. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-804 (1995):
Effect of removal-ownership in common-liens. If the property is removed
556 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
subject to partition.293 If the owners desire, they can resubmit
the property to condominium ownership.2 ' These statutes add
little to what the common law would be in absence of a statute.
With respect to obsolescence, the UOA does not attempt to
define the word, but leaves the decision up to the unit owners at
the time. The statute reads as follows:
OBSOLETE PROPERTY-RESTORATION OR SALE-REMOVAL FROM
CHAPTER. Ninety percent of the unit owners may agree that the
property is obsolete in whole or in part andwhether or not it
shall be renewed and restored or sold and the proceeds of sale
distributed. If 90% of the unit owners agree to renew and re-
store the property, the expense thereof shall be paid by all the
unit owners as common expenses. If 90% of the unit owners
agree to sell the property, the property shall be considered
removed from the provisions of this chapter. 5
One flaw with this section is that the supermajority re-
quired-ninety percent-is simply too high to be optimal in any
but the smallest condominiums.2' The most likely and natural
interpretation of this section is that once ninety percent of the
owners can decide that the property is obsolete, then successive
votes must be held until either (1) ninety percent vote for sale,
with ownership converted to tenancy in common;... or (2)
ninety percent vote for reconstruction. This dreadful procedure is
a prescription for deadlock, prompting some condominium devel-
from the provisions of this chapter, as provided by 70-23-801 through 70-23-
803, the property shall be considered owned in common by all the unit
owners. The percentage of undivided interest of each unit owner in the
property owned in common shall be the same as the percentage of undivid-
ed interest previously owned by such owner in the common elements. Liens
affecting any unit shall be liens, in accordance with the then existing priori-
ties, against the undivided interest of the unit owner in the property owned
in common.
293. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-805 (1995):
Effect of removal-subject to partition--sale. If the property is removed
from the provisions of this chapter, as provided in 70-23-801 through 70-23-
803, it shall be subject to an action for partition at the suit of any unit
owner. The net proceeds of sale, together with the net proceeds of the in-
surance on the property, if any, shall be considered as one fund and shall
be divided among the unit owners in proportion to their respective undi-
vided interests after first paying out of the respective shares of the unit
owners, to the extent sufficient for the purpose, all liens on the undivided
interest in the property owned by each unit owner.
294. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-806 (1995).
295. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-802 (1995).
296. See Nitzan & Paroush, supra note 1.
297. See supra note 292.
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opers to attempt the legally dubious procedure of drafting
around it.298
In event of deadlock during the statutory obsolescence proce-
dure, an owner might be tempted to break that deadlock by
committing arson. This is because arson triggers the UOA provi-
sion on damage and destruction,2 which offers a far easier
resolution. In case of damage or destruction, the associa-
tion-presumably by a bare majority vote--can elect to rebuild.
If it does not so elect within sixty days, the regime is over, and
condominium ownership is converted into a tenancy in com-
mon.3' Interestingly enough, there is no requirement that the
damage or destruction be substantial. Apparently any amount
will do. The section offers intriguing trouble-making possibilities
for disaffected unit owners who believe that their POA has not
moved fast enough to repair minor damage. Accordingly, some
declarations purport to change the statutory rule by requiring
"substantial" damage and inadequacy of insurance before the
condominium can be terminated.'O The validity of such provi-
sions is not certain.
Obviously, these statutes need reform. At the least, there
should be some provision for eminent domain, a reduction in the
awesome supermajorities required for action due to obsolescence,
and a redrafting of the damage rules to make clear that damage
must be substantial before the condominium qualifies for termi-
nation on that basis. Because condominium ownership is still
relatively new and many problems cannot be foreseen, reform
measures also should allow considerable private discretion, both
ex ante-in drafting rules for a new subdivision, and ex post-in
298. See Declaration of Condominium for The Ashberry Condominium, supra note
127 (purporting to permit partition by a majority if the condominium is obsolete and
more than 50 years old).
299. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-803 (1995):
Damage to property--decision not to repair or rebuild-removal from chap-
ter. If within 60 days after the date of the damage to or destruction of all
or part of the property the association of unit owners does not decide to
repair, reconstruct, or rebuild, the property shall be considered removed
from the provisions of this chapter.
300. See supra note 292.
301. See, e.g., Declaration of Unit Ownership for Yellowstone Townhomes, supra
note 168 (insubstantial damage to be repaired; substantial damage to be repaired if
cost not greater than 110% of insurance proceeds; otherwise, majority of owners to
determine whether to repair); Bylaws of The Palace Condominium Ass'n, supra note
127 (repairs to be made unless 75% of building destroyed, in which case 75% of own-
ers must opt to rebuild); Declaration of Condominium for The Ashberry Condomin-
ium, supra note 127 (repairs to be made if insurance proceeds are greater than
$5000 less than cost to repair; if less, then majority decides).
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determining a course of action after the event.
The statutes of several other states contain sensible eminent
domain procedures that could form the basis for reform in Mon-
tana. By way of example, the Utah statute 2 distinguishes be-
tween three kinds of takings-takings of common elements (in
Utah, they are called "common areas and facilities"), takings of
units, and takings of portions of units. In the event common
elements are condemned, "the award... shall be allocated to the
unit owners in proportion to their respective undivided inter-
ests."3" However, the Utah statute does not compensate fairly
an owner of a unit who has suffered disproportionately due to
governmental seizure of part of the common elements. A unit
formerly overlooking a greensward may end up next to a busy
street; the property seized may be limited common elements
appurtenant to a particular unit. There is no provision for pay-
ment of consequential damages in such cases."'
The Utah statute also stipulates that if an individual unit is
condemned, the court is to award to its owner just compensation
for the loss, including the loss of an appurtenant interest in the
common elements. That interest in the common elements is then
to be redivided among the rest of the units. Thus, in Utah it may
be said that at the filing of the declaration, each unit enjoys an
executory interest (of a contingent kind) in the entire common
elements-an interest which may ripen into possession (in whole
or in part) in the event that other units are condemned. Such an
executory interest, if not limited as to the time in which it must
vest, would violate the common law rule against perpetuities.
Accordingly, the Utah legislature has thoughtfully added a sav-
ing provision to its condominium statute.0 5
If a portion, but not all, of a unit is taken, matters become
more complicated. If the unit is still usable, its share of the com-
mon elements is reduced in the same proportion as its fair mar-
ket value is reduced, with appropriate reallocation of those com-
mon elements to other units. The owner then receives compensa-
tion for both the loss to the unit and the loss of part of the inter-
est in the common elements. If the unit is no longer usable, then
its entire portion of the common elements is allocated to other
owners and the remainder of the air space becomes a common
302. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-32.5 (1996).
303. Id.
304. Cf Andrews v. City of Greenbelt, 441 A.2d 1064 (Md. 1982) (holding that
the award must include a sum for such "consequential damages").
305. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-28 (1996).
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element. The owner is compensated for the entire loss.
Maryland also has enacted a condominium condemnation
statute.3° Under Maryland law, the drafters of the declaration
and bylaws may establish any scheme for allocation of the
award, reapportionment of the common elements, or reconstruc-
tion or termination of the regime. In default of a provision in the
declaration, any loss in the general common elements is allocat-
ed among units, as in Utah. Loss of limited common elements is
reimbursed to the affected unit owners, which solves part of the
consequential damage problem.
Loss of a unit, or any portion of one, entitles its owner "to
the entire award for the taking of all or part of his respective
unit and for consequential damages to his unit."0 7 In Mary-
land, unlike Utah, reallocation of common elements as a result of
partial taking of a unit is based upon reduction of a unit's floor
area rather than upon the diminution in its market value." s
Reallocation based on floor area avoids lengthy court disputes
about the comparative market values of various units. Finally,
the Maryland statute provides that liens on a unit superior to
the owner's interest are to be paid off before any distribution is
made to him.3" While either of these two eminent domain mod-
els is preferable to the currently existing Montana law, the
Maryland scheme offers several distinct advantages, including
flexibility in declaration drafting, a readily calculable pay-off
formula, and some compensation for consequential damages.
Rather than attempting to define "obsolescence," or "destruc-
tion" or "substantial," statutory reformers would be well advised
to examine the policy of the UCA, which generally leaves the
question of whether to terminate a condominium to the unit
owners themselves. Thus, section 2-118 of the Act permits termi-
nation for any reason by eighty percent of the unit owners (or a
higher proportion set in the declaration). That section also con-
tains a special provision for condominium units defined in part
by horizontal boundaries.
Similarly, section 3-113(h) of the UCA stipulates that dam-
age or destruction "shall be repaired or replaced promptly by the
association," with uninsured amounts being a common expense.
306. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-112 (1996).
307. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-112(c)(1) (1996).
308. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-112(e) (1996). See also MD. CODE
ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-124(a) (1996) (prevents the rule against perpetuities from
invalidating the resulting executory interests).
309. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-112(f) (1996).
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However, reconstruction will not take place if it would offend
state or local health or safety ordinances. Moreover, eighty per-
cent of the owners may elect not to rebuild or to terminate the
condominium. Any insurance proceeds attributable to any por-
tion of the complex not rebuilt must be distributed to the
lienholders and the owners of the units in that portion.
Several nonuniform statutes have comparable, although less
elaborate, provisions. Most of these laws set the percentage of
votes necessary to terminate at a figure less than eighty per-
cent,310 which as I have noted elsewhere is probably too high
for optimal decision-making in many condominiums.3" ' Any
percentages established by statute ought to vary according to the
number of owners who actually reside in their units, with higher
percentages for complexes that are owner-occupied and lower
figures for complexes with significant numbers of renters. This
reflects the greater importance of the decision for resident own-
ers, who are, of course, more attached to their units than are
investors. It also reflects the fact that votes from investors can
be difficult to procure. Thus, one option might permit termina-
tion of the condominium on approval by eighty percent of all
owner occupants and sixty percent of all lessors.
L Elimination of Needless Regulation
Under the UOA, condominium ownership is subjected to
economic regulation to which other subdivisions are not subject.
For example, section 70-23-613 of the Montana Code imposes
certain disclosure requirements and couples nondisclosure with a
right to cancel.3' 2 The material to be disclosed includes infor-
310. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.14 (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (75 per-
cent); OR. REV. STAT. § 100.605(2) (1990) (60 percent). Florida retains the unanimity
requirement as a default rule, but permits opt-out by declaration. It also contains a
useful list of POA powers granted for the wrap-up of condominium affairs. See FLA
STAT. ANN. § 718.117 (West Supp. 1996).
311. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
312. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-613 (1995):
Disclosure by seller-seller to furnish documents--delay period.
(1) Whenever a person, corporation, or other legal entity constitutes a ma-
jority of the unit owners, the seller or his agent, prior to signing any buy-
sell agreement, shall give to any person purchasing or expressing a desire
to purchase one of the project units notice that: (a) the seller or other per-
son constitutes a majority of the unit owners; (b) any bylaws and adminis-
trative regulations governing the operation of the development and the
association, as adopted by the association, have been adopted by the seller
or other person acting as a majority of the unit owners; and (c) any change
in the bylaws or administrative regulations occurring while the seller or
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mation pertaining to control of the association and copies of the
governing documents. These disclosures are not burdensome and
are likely to facilitate informed agreement among parties. If the
courts find that additional disclosure is necessary to assure actu-
al notice of relevant material facts, it can impose additional
requirements as a matter of common law.
On the other hand, the UOA also includes regulation for
which the empirical basis is questionable. Thus, there seems to
be no real need for the requirement that declarations be ap-
proved by or filed with the Department of Revenue,313 because
that department can obtain condominium assessment informa-
tion in the same way it obtains such information for other sub-
divisions, and approval of condominium names can be handled
through the office of the secretary of state.
By far the most burdensome regulations are those in Part 2
of the UOA.314 These regulations mandate extensive reporting
and inspection procedures, administered by the state Depart-
ment of Commerce, before earnest money deposits can be applied
to construction.
It is difficult to justify these procedures empirically. There
are no reported cases in Montana arising from misuse of earnest
money deposits, either in condominiums nor in other subdivi-
sions, where the statute is inapplicable. Moreover, the Depart-
ment of Commerce official responsible for such filings stated that
he had never heard of such cases either.3" In my view the law
should not regulate in the absence of proven abuse. About the
best that can be said of the Part 2 procedures is that they are
used very seldom. 1 One interpretation of why this is so is that
other person constitutes a majority of the unit owners may be made only
with the approval of the seller or other person constituting a majority of
unit owners.
(2) Upon the request of any person purchasing or expressing a desire to
purchase one of the project units, the seller or his agent shall furnish to
that buyer or prospective buyer, prior to signing any buy-sell agreement, a
copy of the Unit Ownership Act, the bylaws of the association, and any
administrative regulations governing the operation of the project or the
association.
(3) Any buy-sell agreement shall provide that it is not effective until 72
hours after the prospective purchaser has received the documents required
in subsection (2), and during that delay the prospective purchaser may
withdraw his offer without penalty.
313. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-304, -305 (1995).
314. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-23-201 to -206 (1995).
315. Telephone Interview with Robert Verdon, Staff Legal Counsel for the Pro-
fessional and Occupational Licensing Bureau, Department of Commerce, State of
Montana (Aug. 8, 1996).
316. See id. (no state inspections or reports in 1995, one in 1994, none in 1993,
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developers would rather not use earnest money deposits than
comply with the procedures,317 but in the absence of empirical
support, this cannot be said with certainty.
These procedures should be repealed unless justified empiri-
cally. If abuse of earnest money deposits does occur, the legisla-
ture should substitute simpler procedures of either compulsory
escrow31 or an escrow-or-bonding option. In that event, the
requirement should be extended to noncondominium subdivisions
as well.
Elimination of UOA Part 2 should be coupled with repeal of
one of the most disturbing parts of the law: the section granting
an executive branch agency (the Department of Commerce) pow-
er to invent new crimes.1 9
VI. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDED REFORMS
Despite numerous drafting infelicities, the UOA has worked
fairly well because its core philosophy is sound: a condominium
statute should serve primarily as a safe harbor. The legislature
should retain this philosophy and amend the statute to further
it. The legislature should shun the temptation to overregulate. It
should not adopt the UCA, the UCIOA or any other comprehen-
sive codification. On the contrary, the legislature should repeal
several bits of needless regulation now within the UOA.32°
The legislature should undertake several technical reforms.
Lawmakers should amend confusing statutory language carried
over from civil law practice, 21 use a term other than "manager"
to describe the POA governing authority,32 explain that units
do not need to be within walls, 23 and change the definition of
"unit owner" to clarify that leasehold condominiums are permit-
ted.32 When units are not to be within walls, the requirement
of floor plans should, of course, be waived.325
With respect to the basic documents of the condominium, the
legislature should alter the statute so that only the declaration
and one in 1992).
317. See id.
.318. As in UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 4-110, 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 349 (1997).,
319. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-1002 (1995).
320. See supra Part V(I).
321. See supra Part III(B).
322. See id.
323. See supra Part V(A).
324. See supra Part V(D).
325. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-23-306 (1995).
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need be recorded. The declaration should include all the basic
elements defining unit owners' property interests: description of
units, future interests, covenants, and so forth. Floor plans
should be made part of the declaration rather than merely filed
with the declaration.
2 6
The declaration should be allowed to specify each unit's
share of the common elements without reference to "value."
3 27
Amendment procedure should be as specified in the declaration,
with minimum required supermajority (probably around sixty
percent) and a default rule for amendment (probably around
seventy-five percent) if the instrument is silent on the sub-
ject.3" The legislature also should provide that condominium
covenants contained in a declaration (or in the bylaws, in the
case of condominiums formed prior to statutory amendment)
continue to run with the land even after foreclosure."s The leg-
islature may also wish to include a list of items that, if inserted
in the condominium declaration, will be legally enforceable.
Among these are use of arbitration and other forms of alterna-
tive dispute resolution,' and a unit owner's bill of rights.33'
The association should be governed by the statutes normally
applicable to non-profit corporations. There should be no need to
record instruments inferior to the declaration.3 2
The assessment lien ought to receive priority over first mort-
gages, at least to the extent set forth in the UCA.3" The legis-
lature also should adjust the statutory language governing blan-
ket liens to comply with case law.'
Lawmakers should correct the Montana Supreme Court's
326. See supra Part V(B).
327. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
328. See supra Part V(B).
329. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
330. Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255 (West 1988). Such provisions, besides en-
couraging judicial economy, also encourage decentralized development of private law.
See Rubin, supra note 1.
331. As noted by Professor French, there is a trend toward granting property
owners associations more power. See Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private
Residential Government Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
345, 349 (1992). Professor Winokur has argued that there are significant dangers in
that approach. See Winokur, Mixed, supra note 1. As a possible remedy, Professor
French suggests provision for a voluntary unit owners' bill of rights. See French,
supra.
332. The directors might wish to record these to increase chances that new own-
ers have actual notice of them, for new owners without actual notice may not be
bound by such rules. See Natelson, Consent, supra note 1.
333. See supra Part V(EX2).
334. See supra notes 225-67 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of the "standing to sue" statute by clarifying that
the association may represent unit owners even when the defen-
dants include other unit owners.3 5 They also should adopt ter-
mination provisions similar to those in the UCA and eminent do-
main provisions similar to those in force in Maryland.336
The general approach behind the UOA has served Montana
well for thirty years. Thoughtfully amended, it may offer even
better service for the next thirty.
335. See supra Part V(G).
336. See supra Part V(H).
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